Coming to Grips With the Ethical Challenges for Capital Post-Conviction Representation Posed by Martinez v. Ryan by Blume, John H. & Wendel, W. Bradley
Florida Law Review
Volume 68 | Issue 3 Article 7
June 2017
Coming to Grips With the Ethical Challenges for
Capital Post-Conviction Representation Posed by
Martinez v. Ryan
John H. Blume
W. Bradley Wendel
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida Law Review by
an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact averyle@law.ufl.edu, kaleita@law.ufl.edu.
Recommended Citation
John H. Blume and W. Bradley Wendel, Coming to Grips With the Ethical Challenges for Capital Post-Conviction Representation Posed by
Martinez v. Ryan, 68 Fla. L. Rev. 765 (2017).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol68/iss3/7
765 
COMING TO GRIPS WITH THE ETHICAL CHALLENGES FOR 
CAPITAL POST-CONVICTION REPRESENTATION POSED BY 
MARTINEZ V. RYAN 
John H. Blume* and W. Bradley Wendel** 
Abstract 
 
In its groundbreaking decision in Martinez v. Ryan, 556 U.S. 1 (2012), 
the Supreme Court of the United States held that inadequate assistance of 
post-conviction counsel could be sufficient “cause” to excuse a 
procedural default thus allowing a federal court in habeas corpus 
proceedings to reach the merits of an otherwise barred claim that an 
inmate was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective 
assistance of counsel at trial. The upshot of Martinez is that, if state post-
conviction counsel unreasonably (and prejudicially) fails to raise a viable 
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, then there is “cause” (and 
likely also prejudice), and thus a gateway to merits’ review of the claim 
in federal habeas corpus proceedings. This is potentially a good thing for 
many habeas petitioners, but creates a serious and as-yet unappreciated 
ethical problem for federal habeas counsel who also served as state post-
conviction counsel. In capital post-conviction cases, the pre-Martinez 
preference and practice was for continuity of counsel from state to federal 
court. Now that ineffective representation in state post-conviction 
proceedings can serve as a basis for review of otherwise defaulted claims, 
however, a lawyer may be materially limited in her ability to provide 
ongoing representation by the client’s interest in asserting an 
ineffectiveness claim. 
Lawyers who practice in the area of civil litigation or transactional 
representation are familiar with these “prior work” conflicts and the 
solution to them, which is to obtain the informed consent of the affected 
client after full disclosure of the facts that give rise to the conflict and of 
the available alternatives. In the capital habeas context, however, the 
usual apparatus of professional responsibility law, including the informed 
consent doctrine and the potential of malpractice liability for mis-
handling a conflict, are ill-suited to dealing with the problem thrust upon 
petitioners’ counsel by Martinez. Ironically, even though the tort doctrine 
of malpractice and the rules of professional conduct are both intended to 
                                                                                                                     
 * Samuel F. Leibowitz Professor of Trial Techniques, Cornell Law School. 
 ** Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. The author gratefully acknowledges the research 
funding provided by the Judge Albert Conway Memorial Fund for Legal Research, established by 
the William C. and Joyce C. O’Neil Charitable Trust to honor the memory of Judge Conway, 
Chief Judge of the New York State Court of Appeals from 1954 to 1959 and his son, Hewitt A. 
Conway, a member of the Cornell Law School Class of 1949. We are grateful to Bruce Green, 
Joe Margulies, Dana Remus, Keir Weyble, and participants in the Cornell Law School faculty 
retreat for helpful comments on this Article.  
1
Blume and Wendel: Coming to Grips With the Ethical Challenges for Capital Post-Conv
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
766 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
 
protect clients, the rules allow the possibly negligent lawyer to decide 
whether client protection requires disclosure and consent, or possibly 
withdrawal from representation. Given the significance of ineffective 
assistance of counsel in capital cases, however, this kind of self-
monitoring would be intolerable. Hence, the puzzle presented by 
Martinez, which recognizes the inability of lawyers to self-monitor, but 
fails to provide a mechanism for ensuring that the client’s rights are 
adequately protected. 
This Article suggests, therefore, that petitioners’ counsel cannot bear 
the sole responsibility for solving the Martinez dilemma. The other 
systemic and repeat players—States’ attorneys and judges—also have to 
do their part. After all, it is the invocation of procedural defenses in an 
effort to preclude merits’ review of the habeas petitioner’s federal 
constitutional claims that creates the procedural morass we have 
described. This in turn leads to both inefficient litigation and unjust 
results. Thus, in most instances, if attorneys for the state agreed—either 
on their own or after being “leaned on” by the court—to waive procedural 
default and allow the court to proceed to the merits, then litigation would 
proceed expeditiously and without the ethical taint of potential and actual 
conflicts of interest. If the claims are not bona fide, they will be rejected. 
On the other hand, if the issues not previously raised are in fact 
meritorious, then there are no true “losers” unless one believes that death 
sentences resulting from a trial infected with prejudicial constitutional 
error should be carried out. Without some cooperative solution, courts 
will be faced with motions for substitution of counsel or the appointment 
of independent counsel to evaluate the performance of state post-
conviction counsel; state attorneys general will have to deal with the 
possibility of further delay while the conflict issue is adjudicated. Thus, 
the tentatively hopeful conclusion to this exploration of the conundrum 
of Martinez is that the institutional actors with a stake in procedures and 
outcomes will work together to create an avenue for credible claims of 
inadequate state post-conviction representation to be investigated 
competently, for clients to be fully informed and involved in the decision-
making process, and ultimately the client’s wishes respected. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In its groundbreaking decision in Martinez v. Ryan,1 the Supreme 
Court held that inadequate assistance of state post-conviction counsel 
could satisfy the “cause” requirement necessary to allow a federal court 
in habeas corpus proceedings to reach the merits of an otherwise 
procedurally barred claim alleging that an inmate was deprived of his 
Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial.2 
That was quite a mouthful, but what does it actually mean? This Article 
first attempts to “unpack” the terms, its content,  and then explores the 
ethical issues the Court’s decision poses for attorneys representing 
prisoners in federal habeas corpus actions. 
A person charged with a crime in state or federal court has a Sixth 
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel.3 If the defendant is 
indigent, then under most circumstances, she is entitled to court-
appointed counsel.4 A defendant is not just entitled to a lawyer; the 
lawyer must be competent, or in the Supreme Court’s terms, the 
defendant (theoretically) has the right to the “effective assistance of 
counsel.”5 In most jurisdictions, a defendant who pleads guilty or is 
                                                                                                                     
 1. 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). 
 2.  Id. at 1319–20 (“[A]n attorney’s negligence in a postconviction proceeding does not 
establish cause . . . .”).  
 3. The Sixth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. VI. 
 4. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340, 345 (1963). In Gideon, the Supreme Court 
held that indigent defendants are entitled to court-appointed counsel in criminal cases but did not 
specify the precise scope of the right. Id. Subsequently, in Scott v. Illinois, the Court held that a 
court cannot sentence a criminal defendant to a term of actual imprisonment “unless the State has 
afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel.” 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979). A 
suspended sentence is considered to be “actual” imprisonment. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 
654, 657–58, 674 (2002). 
 5. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 
397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)). A lawyer is not “effective” for Sixth Amendment purposes if the 
attorney’s performance was both “deficient” (i.e., objectively unreasonable) and “prejudicial” 
(i.e., there is a reasonable probability that had the lawyer performed adequately, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different). See id. at 687–88, 694. This Article uses the word 
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convicted at trial and wishes to assert a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel must do so in state post-conviction proceedings.6 Every state has, 
by one name or another, a post-conviction procedure for persons 
adjudicated guilty of a crime to present additional evidence as to why the 
court should vacate the conviction or sentence.7 That is where, for the 
most part, defendants assert claims of ineffective or inadequate assistance 
of counsel.8 If the inmate is unsuccessful in the state courts, she can ask 
the federal courts, via the “great writ” of federal habeas corpus,9 to review 
federal constitutional challenges to the conviction or sentence, including 
a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.10 
However, among other obstacles to a federal court vacating a state court 
conviction, if the defendant did not present a federal claim to the state 
courts during state post-conviction proceedings, then the federal courts 
will not entertain the issue due to principles of comity and federalism, or 
more simply, respect for state court judgments and the finality of 
                                                                                                                     
“theoretically” advisedly. The Strickland standard is widely—and correctly—criticized for 
tolerating grossly incompetent representation. See, e.g., John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, 
Gideon Exceptionalism?, 122 YALE L.J. 2126, 2138–39 (2013). 
 6.  See generally John H. Blume, An Introduction to Post-conviction Remedies, Practice 
and Procedure in South Carolina, 45 S.C. L. REV. 235, 239, 242 (1994) (illustrating that a post-
conviction proceeding can pertain to the right of counsel).  
 7. See, e.g., id. at 238, 245 (tracing the history and development of South Carolina’s state 
post-conviction procedures). 
 8. The writ of habeas corpus is still sometimes used in South Carolina to challenge the 
validity of a conviction or sentence. See id. at 262. The Sixth Amendment does not require states 
to appoint counsel in state post-conviction proceedings (but many do); however, an inmate has 
the right—if he can afford to do so—to retain counsel.  See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing an 
accused the right “to the Assistance of Counsel for his defence” in criminal prosecutions). But see 
Blume & Johnson, supra note 5, at 2138 (noting the difficulties for defendants alleging 
deprivation of the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel). For the most 
part, state courts push adjudication of ineffective assistance claims to post-conviction proceedings 
because, by and large, a court cannot decide such assertions of attorney incompetence simply by 
reviewing the “cold” trial record. See Eve Brensike Primus, Effective Trial Counsel After Martinez 
v. Ryan: Focusing on the Adequacies of State Procedures, 122 YALE L.J. 2604, 2609 (2013) 
(“Because ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims are often predicated on what trial attorneys 
failed to do, they frequently require extrarecord development.”). Additional evidence is often 
needed, such as counsel’s reasons for pursuing (or not pursuing) certain courses of action or lines 
of defense. See id.  
 9. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 (1963). 
 10. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (2012) (mandating when a court may grant an application for 
a writ of habeas corpus). Before seeking federal review, the inmate must first present to the state 
courts any alleged federal constitutional defects in her conviction or sentence. Id. This is referred 
to as the exhaustion-of-state-remedies requirement. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 513, 516 
(1982) (discussing the development and scope of the “exhaustion doctrine”). The general purpose 
of the rule is to provide—as a matter of comity and federalism—state courts with the first 
opportunity to consider claims that call into question the constitutional validity of one of its 
criminal convictions. Id. at 518.  
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convictions.11 In the habeas corpus taxonomy, the claim is generally 
considered to be “procedurally defaulted” because it was not raised in the 
right court at the right time.12 Procedural default precludes a merits’ 
review of the claim by the federal courts unless the inmate can show 
“cause” and “prejudice” for failing to present the claim to the state courts 
or a manifest miscarriage of justice (i.e., actual innocence of the 
offense).13 “Cause” is generally a reason not attributable to the inmate for 
failing to raise the claim earlier,14 and “prejudice” in this context means 
that the failure to raise the claim earlier (or adequately) had an effect on 
the prior proceedings that may have changed the outcome of the trial.15  
Prior to Martinez, the Court had rejected arguments that failings of 
state post-conviction counsel, even shockingly poor representation, could 
serve as “cause” for failing to raise a claim properly in state court.16 The 
Court rejected these arguments primarily because it had concluded that 
there was no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in state or federal post-
                                                                                                                     
 11. See id. at 518–19 (holding that a total exhaustion rule will encourage state prisoners to 
first seek full relief, including relief for federal claims, from the state court).  
 12. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 83–85 (1977). Other common examples of state 
procedural defaults include failing to lodge a contemporaneous objection at trial and failing to 
raise a properly preserved claim on direct appeal. See id. at 83 n.8 (citing Henry v. Mississippi, 
379 U.S. 443 (1965)); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161 (1996).  
 13. Gray, 518 U.S. at 162; Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 90–91. It is actually a bit more 
complicated than what this Article presented above. The claim could be “unexhausted” (and not 
procedurally defaulted) if the state courts allow a state prisoner to file more than one application 
for post-conviction relief. The exhaustion-of-state-remedies doctrine requires inmates who file a 
federal habeas petition to first present claims of constitutional error to the state courts. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254 (2012); Rose, 455 U.S. at 516, 518 (“[O]ne court should defer action on causes properly 
within its jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty . . . have had an opportunity to pass 
upon the matter.” (quoting Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950))). But because most states 
have a “one bite at the apple” rule for persons seeking post-conviction relief, in most instances, 
the claim will be “exhausted” because the inmate does not have a currently available state remedy 
and procedurally defaulted because the defendant did not present the claim to the state courts in 
post-conviction proceedings. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 98 So. 3d 484, 487 (Miss. Ct. App. 
2012) (quoting Dobbs v. State, 18 So. 3d 259, 298 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)).   
 14. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (explaining that the defendant must 
ususually establish “cause” by showing that an “objective factor external to the defense impeded 
counsel’s efforts”). 
 15. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 289, 291 (1999) (finding that the petitioner did 
not show prejudice, which would have excused a procedural default, because the prosecution’s 
failure to disclose favorable information did not give rise to a reasonable probability of a different 
outcome at trial). 
 16. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 727, 750, 757 (1991) (holding that post-
conviction counsel’s negligent failure to file a timely notice of appeal in a capital post-conviction 
proceeding, which led to the procedural default of all of the death-sentenced inmate’s claims, 
failed to satisfy the “cause” requirement). 
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conviction proceedings.17 Thus, if there is no right to counsel, then, a 
fortiori, there is no right to the effective assistance of counsel.18 The 
Court then fell back to the default principle that lawyers are generally 
regarded as the client’s agent.19 Therefore, counsel’s mistakes are 
deemed attributable to the defendant.20 Although the Court did not make 
this reasoning explicit, it could have relied upon the role assigned by rules 
of professional conduct to defense counsel to monitor his own 
performance, ensure that there are no conflicts of interest, and do 
whatever additional work is necessary to acquire the skill required to 
render competent performance.21 
But in Martinez, the Court changed tack and recognized for the first 
time that—as a matter of equity—inadequate assistance of post-
conviction counsel could, under some circumstances, be “cause” for 
failing to raise claims in state post-conviction proceedings.22 Under what 
circumstances though? First, the exception applies only to claims of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.23 If state post-conviction counsel 
fails to identify and present other types of common post-conviction 
claims, e.g., prosecutorial misconduct in failing to disclose exculpatory 
information or juror misconduct—no matter how meritorious the issue 
might be—Martinez’s equitable exception does not apply.24 Second, the 
                                                                                                                     
 17. Id. at 754–55. Every state has state post-conviction procedures, although federal law 
does not require them. See Blume, supra note 6, at 241, 258 n.169 (explaining how state courts 
chose to expand the scope of post-conviction proceedings in response to the Supreme Court’s 
expansion of the availability of habeas corpus). The basis of the Court’s rejection of a 
constitutional right to counsel post-trial lies in the language of the Sixth Amendment, which 
guarantees counsel to an “accused” for his “defence.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In the Court’s view, 
after an adjudication of guilt, either by trial or plea, a defendant is no longer an “accused” person 
presenting a defense. Rather, he is a convicted person attempting to overturn a presumptively 
lawful determination of guilt. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610–11 (1974). 
 18. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752.  
 19. See id. at 753–54. 
 20. See id. 
 21. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 6.2 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). 
 22. 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1320 (2012). 
 23. See id. at 1317–18.  
 24. Justice Kennedy was quite explicit about this. Id. at 1317 (noting that effective 
assistance of counsel at trial is a “bedrock principle in our justice system”). However, as the 
dissent noted, there is no principled basis for limiting the exception to trial-level ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims. See id. at 1321 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For example, claims that the 
prosecution withheld exculpatory, material information (commonly referred to as Brady claims) 
are also generally not available on direct appeal because the suppression of evidence has not yet 
come to light. See, e.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 675, 693, 698 (2004) (granting a new 
penalty phase to a death-sentenced inmate based on the suppression of information discovered for 
the first time in federal habeas corpus proceedings). The same is also true in many cases involving 
juror misconduct. See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 440 (2000) (finding that there was 
“cause” in a state post-conviction proceeding for petitioner’s failure to raise the claim that a juror 
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exception only applies to jurisdictions that, either explicitly or as a matter 
of practice, require claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel to be 
asserted in state post-conviction proceedings.25 In the Court’s view, if a 
defendant cannot challenge trial counsel’s competency on direct 
appeal—a proceeding in which she would have the right to the effective 
assistance of appellate counsel—then the state collateral review process 
constitutes the first opportunity for review.26 Thus, this process is akin to 
an appeal “as of right,” in which the defendant is guaranteed the right to 
the effective assistance of counsel.27  
Returning to the bottom line, if state post-conviction counsel 
unreasonably (and prejudicially) fails to raise a viable claim of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel, then there is “cause” (and likely 
“prejudice”)—and thus a gateway to a merits’ review of the claim in 
federal habeas corpus proceedings. So far, so good. But, in many 
instances, state post-conviction counsel is also federal habeas corpus 
counsel. In fact, in capital post-conviction cases, the pre-Martinez 
preference and practice was for continuity of counsel from state to federal 
court.28 For obvious reasons, having state post-conviction counsel 
represent the inmate in federal court was believed to promote higher 
quality and more cost-effective representation. State post-conviction 
counsel will also be familiar with the trial and post-conviction records 
and the issues in the case (and thus will not need additional time to “get 
up to speed”), but will also—in most instances—have a positive working 
relationship with the client. And, given the paucity of funding for counsel 
(and experts) in many states in state collateral proceedings,29 state post-
                                                                                                                     
lied on voir dire when evidence was not discovered until completion of direct appeal and state 
collateral review).  
 25. See Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1918, 1921 (2013) (finding that Texas law, as a 
matter of course, requires defendants to assert ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in state 
post-conviction proceedings because the “Texas procedural system . . . does not offer most 
defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
on direct appeal”). 
 26. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315–16. 
 27. See id. at 1319. While the Court analogized post-conviction proceedings in this context 
to an appeal of right, it did not hold that there is a constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction 
proceedings; instead, the Court relied upon principles of equity to create the exception for 
otherwise procedurally barred claims. Id. at 1319–20. Presumably, it did so in an attempt to 
“cabin” the exception—limit it to ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, which would have 
been impossible had the Court recognized a constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction 
proceedings. See id. Perhaps it also did so to limit the fiscal burden on the states that would follow 
from creating a constitutional right to counsel. 
 28. See Guide to the Appointment and Compensation of Counsel Under the Criminal Justice 
Act, section *.28. See 7A ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY 
§ 220.25(c) (2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/2793/download. 
 29.  Benjamin H. Barton & Sephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro 
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conviction counsel may have taken the case through the state collateral 
appeals system hoping to recoup some of their investment in federal court 
given the relatively better compensation system for counsel in federal 
habeas corpus cases.30 
Yet this common and preferred practice developed in a legal regime 
in which inadequate assistance of state post-conviction counsel was of no 
significance. That is no longer true; it is now a means of having federal 
courts adjudicate procedurally defaulted claims, and thus—in any given 
case—could literally be the difference between a client rotting in prison 
or being released and, in some instances, lives or dies.31 Given this shift 
in the relevance of the quality of state post-conviction representation, 
what are the implications of Martinez’s recognition of inadequate 
assistance of post-conviction counsel as “cause” for a procedural default 
for cases currently pending in (or about to enter) federal habeas corpus 
proceedings where counsel who are appointed (or seek to be appointed) 
represented the inmate in state post-conviction proceedings? The 
question becomes more complicated when considered in light of a 
defense attorney’s obligations under both the Sixth Amendment’s right 
to effective assistance of counsel and the rules of professional conduct 
generally applicable to all lawyers.32 Although criminal defense lawyers 
                                                                                                                     
Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PENN. L. REV. 967, 972–73 (2012); see also Ira P. Robbins, Toward 
a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 
76–77 (1990) (noting that many states pay attorneys virtually nothing to defend in capital cases). 
 30. It is not always the case that state post-conviction counsel also represents the inmate in 
federal habeas corpus proceedings. Sometimes, the client may want new counsel, or the lawyer 
may conclude she is not competent to represent the client in federal court given the complexity of 
federal habeas corpus. In other cases, the state collateral appeals lawyer may work for a state 
defender organization that cannot appear in federal court, or the jurisdiction may have a unit in a 
Federal Public Defender’s Office (generally referred to as Capital Habeas Units) that is staffed 
and funded to represent persons only in federal habeas proceedings. See, e.g., Capital Habeas 
Unit, FED. PUB. DEFENDER: DISTRICT ARIZ., http://www.fpdaz.org/#!capital-habeas-unit/bgm64 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2016). But, prevailing national practice, especially in active death penalty 
jurisdictions such as Alabama, Texas, South Carolina, and Virginia, is for continuity of 
representation from state to federal court.  
 31. For example, the State of Virgina executed Roger Coleman after denying him federal 
habeas review because his state post-conviction attorneys filed a notice of appeal three days late. 
See Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, Innocence and the Death Penalty: 
Assessing the Danger of Mistaken Executions, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Oct. 21, 1993), http:// 
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-death-penalty-assessing-dangermistaken-executions. 
 32. All lawyers are subject to professional discipline, with sanctions ranging from a private 
reprimand up to suspension from practice or disbarment, which courts of the state of the lawyer’s 
admission mete out. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 3.2, at 82, § 3.5, at 
118 (student ed. 1986). The power to impose discipline is theoretically reposed in the state’s 
supreme court, although investigation and prosecution of disciplinary matters is generally 
delegated to an agency of the court. See 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF 
LAWYERING § 1.16, 30–31 (3d ed. Supp. 2014). Discipline is based on evidence of a violation of 
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and prosecutors quite understandably tend to think first in terms of 
constitutional principles, they must also comply with the lawyer 
disciplinary rules of the state of their admission. Under these rules, a state 
post-conviction lawyer who failed—unreasonably and with prejudice—
to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim with respect to trial-
court representation likely has a material-limitation conflict of interest 
under state versions of the concurrent conflicts rule.33  
Lawyers who practice in the area of civil litigation or transactional 
representation are familiar with “prior work” conflicts and the solution to 
them, which is to obtain the informed consent of the affected client after 
full disclosure of the facts giving rise to the conflict and the available 
alternatives.34 As this Article discusses below, however, the standard 
response within the law of professional responsibility—relying on the 
informed consent doctrine—is ill adapted to the circumstances of 
criminal defense, particularly capital defense representation.35  
Martinez further complicates the standard approach by significantly 
increasing the stakes around the evaluation of an attorney’s own 
malpractice and potential conflicts of interest. In the ordinary case, an 
attorney is constantly making judgment calls, and maybe some of them 
are mistakes. Most of these mistakes, however, will not end up amounting 
to much, and even if they do, they are unlikely to subject the attorney to 
liability for malpractice. Only in the unusual event of a mistake that 
creates a substantial likelihood of subjecting the attorney to civil liability 
will there be a conflict of interest requiring the attorney to obtain the 
client’s informed consent. Significantly, the rules of professional conduct 
allow attorneys to make this judgment call as well. Attorneys decide 
when they have made a mistake sufficiently serious to constitute 
malpractice, when potential malpractice constitutes a conflict of interest, 
whether that conflict is waivable, and what disclosure is adequate as a 
ground for the client’s informed consent.36 Ironically, even though the 
                                                                                                                     
state rules of professional conduct. This Article uses the terms “rules of professional conduct” and 
“disciplinary rules” interchangeably here (with the latter term invoking the familiar “subject to 
discipline” standard used on the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam).  
 33. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (“[A] lawyer 
shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A 
concurrent conflict of interest exists if: . . . there is a significant risk that the representation of one 
or more clients will be materially limited . . . by a personal interest of the lawyer.”). 
 34. See id. r. 1.0(e) (defining “informed consent” as “the agreement by a person to a 
proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and 
explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed 
course of conduct”). 
 35. See infra Section II.C. 
 36. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7, cmt. 2 (giving the lawyer responsibility 
for determining the existence of a conflict, whether it is waivable, and what disclosure is required 
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tort doctrine of malpractice and the rules of professional conduct are both 
intended to protect clients, the rules allow the possibly negligent lawyer 
to decide whether client protection requires disclosure and consent, or 
possibly withdrawal from representation.37 Given the significance of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in capital cases, however, this kind of 
self-monitoring would be intolerable. Hence, the puzzle presented by 
Martinez, which recognizes the inability of lawyers to self-monitor, but 
fails to provide a mechanism for ensuring that the client’s rights are 
adequately protected. 
The difficulty of the Martinez problem is illustrated by a recent case 
decided by the Supreme Court, Christeson v. Roper.38 In Christeson, 
counsel appointed to represent a death row inmate missed the filing 
deadline for their client’s federal habeas petition, leading to its dismissal 
as untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996 (AEDPA).39 Although the Court did not rule on the issue, counsel’s 
inexplicable errors, including not only miscalculating the limitations 
period but also failing to communicate with their client after being 
appointed at a particularly time-critical period, were likely the types of 
“serious . . . attorney misconduct” that could equitably toll the statute of 
limitations.40 For the attorneys to argue for equitable tolling, however, 
would be to admit their own incompetence, creating a conflict between 
the attorneys’ duty to provide competent and diligent representation and 
their interest in preserving their professional reputations.41 The conflict 
created by their prior incompetence rendered the attorneys unable to 
represent the petitioner in the ongoing litigation, involving as it would the 
attempt to equitably toll the AEDPA statute of limitations.42 But 
Christeson only highlights the Martinez problem; it does not point toward 
                                                                                                                     
in order to satisfy the informed consent standard). We are grateful to Bruce Green for emphasizing 
this aspect of the usual relationship between malpractice and conflicts of interest.  
 37.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7  cmt. 4.  
 38. 135 S. Ct. 891 (2015). 
 39. Id. at 892. 
 40. Id. at 892, 894 (quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 651–52 (2010)). 
 41. Id. at 894. The Court gives the attorneys some credit for recognizing this conflict, but 
the attorneys actually missed the point completely. They noted that a hearing on whether they had 
abandoned their client (and thus created grounds for equitable tolling) would involve them as 
essential witnesses. Id. This would involve a violation of the advocate–witness rule. See MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.7(a). The advocate–witness rule, which is really aimed at 
preventing jury confusion and is in any event waivable if disqualification would work substantial 
hardship on the client, id. r. 3.7(a)(3) cmt. 2, was the least of the attorneys’ problems. A substantial 
likelihood that the attorneys would make arguments that “manifestly served their own 
professional and reputational interests,” to the direct detriment to their client’s interests, is a 
serious and non-waivable conflict under Rule 1.7(a)(1) of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct. Christeson, 135 S. Ct. at 895. 
 42. Christeson, 135 S. Ct. at 895. 
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a solution. The attorneys’ conflict of interest came to the attention of the 
district court through the efforts of independent lawyers who had 
examined the case and immediately spotted the conflict.43 If this second 
pair of lawyers had not injected themselves into the case (as there is 
currently no mechanism to ensure the involvement of conflict-free 
substitute counsel), the petitioner would have lost the opportunity to 
argue for equitable tolling and file a federal habeas petition. 
This Article’s analysis begins in Part I by attempting to disentangle 
the relationship between the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the 
effective assistance of counsel and the rules of professional conduct 
adopted by state courts for the regulation of lawyers in that state. Courts, 
including the Supreme Court, sometimes talk as though a lawyer’s 
obligations under the rules of professional conduct are some kind of 
lower-order law that is less important than the Sixth Amendment. While 
of course the Constitution is the supreme law of the land and state courts 
may not impose duties on counsel that contravene it, lawyers quite 
understandably are concerned with complying with all the standards that 
govern their professional conduct. As a criminal procedure and a 
professional responsibility scholar, respectively, we speak somewhat 
different languages when talking about the duties of a criminal defense 
attorney—but this Article indicates that these perspectives must be 
integrated when considering the Martinez dilemma. Accordingly, Part II 
takes a step back from the specific context of state and federal post-
conviction representation and looks at prior-work conflicts of interest 
more generally, as they would be handled under the state rules of 
professional conduct. In an ideal case, as noted above, it would be 
possible for a lawyer to handle this problem by providing full disclosure 
to the client and obtaining the client’s informed consent to continued 
representation.44 As is so often the case, however, “death is different,”45 
and there are features of capital defense representation that make the 
problem of prior-work conflicts much more difficult to deal with. The 
insidious nature of entrusting an attorney to self-monitor conflicts of 
interest, even when there are reasons to question the attorney’s capacity 
for exercising independent judgment, may be tolerable in ordinary civil 
malpractice cases and is certainly tolerable in those frequently litigated 
cases involving sophisticated, repeat-player clients. But in the 
representation of individual, disempowered clients—often suffering from 
mental illness or cognitive disabilities—there must be an alternative to 
the usual approach. Finally, Part III considers the contextual features that 
make conflicts of interest particularly difficult in federal habeas 
                                                                                                                     
 43. See id. at 892–93.  
 44. See supra text accompanying note 37.  
 45. See, e.g., Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 185 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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representation and suggests some approaches to resolving Martinez 
conflicts in the inherently non-ideal world of capital litigation. 
I.  THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
The norms governing criminal defense lawyering, including post-
conviction representation, are an amalgam of several different bodies of 
law that stand in an uneasy relationship to one another. However, they all 
create duties on the part of lawyers, despite the tendency of some lawyers 
to ignore them. In particular, criminal defense lawyers accustomed to 
thinking in terms of the Sixth Amendment’s right to the effective 
assistance of counsel may sometimes overlook the disciplinary rules 
governing conflicts of interest. Civil litigators and transactional lawyers 
live and die by the conflicts rules because they can make the difference 
between the ability to accept a long-lasting, lucrative representation of a 
client and the obligation to decline such representation. Litigating 
motions to disqualify is an expensive headache even if the motion is 
ultimately unsuccessful, so lawyers spend a great deal of energy on 
prevention strategies designed to head off the possibility of 
disqualification. Criminal defense lawyers, by contrast, tend to analyze 
conflicts exclusively in terms of the Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel, which has the relatively unusual remedy of a new 
trial, as seen in Sixth Amendment cases such as Cuyler v. Sullivan46 and 
Mickens v. Taylor.47 While all lawyers are in principle subject to state 
rules of professional conduct, many criminal defense lawyers overlook 
these professional responsibilities and focus only on the Sixth 
Amendment standards. 
While there is plenty of ignorance of the law governing lawyers to go 
around, among both civil and criminal litigators, many civil lawyers at 
least practice in large law firms with in-house counsel to advise them on 
the technical aspects of conflicts of interest.48 These firms are also 
generally very sensitive to the possibility of civil liability for malpractice 
or breach of fiduciary duty, and they are often subject to malpractice 
insurance guidelines that limit potential liability exposure. Criminal 
defense lawyers, by contrast, may work in large public defender 
                                                                                                                     
 46. 446 U.S. 335, 342–43 (1980). Sullivan, in turn, was based on earlier cases such as 
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484 (1978), and Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 
(1942). See Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 349–50. Sullivan, Holloway, and Glasser differ from the now-
standard Sixth Amendment framework subsequently established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 697 (1984), in that Strickland requires an additional showing of prejudice. 
 47. 535 U.S. 162, 164 (2002). 
 48. Elizabeth Chambliss, The Scope of In-Firm Privilege, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1721, 
1721 (2005).  
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organizations but are frequently solo or small-firm practitioners and 
therefore do not have the same kind of compliance infrastructure.49 
However, they do consider potential claims for ineffective assistance of 
counsel, which becomes the primary framework for understanding 
conflicts of interest in criminal defense representation. Courts also 
sometimes overlook the duties imposed by the rules of professional 
conduct, perhaps unaware that a defense lawyer who raises a conflict of 
interest is not playing games or stalling for time but trying in good faith 
to comply with her obligations under the disciplinary rules. This Part 
analyzes the Martinez dilemma by considering the relationship between 
the federal and state systems of regulating the professional conduct of 
lawyers.  
It is admirable for defense lawyers to aim at representation that 
satisfies the minimum guarantees of the Constitution, but it is a serious 
mistake, analytically and as a matter of ethical lawyering, to fail to 
consider duties that go beyond the constitutional floor established by the 
ineffective assistance of counsel cases. Concerns over the remedy that 
follows from a finding of ineffective assistance pervade many Sixth 
Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel cases; if there is a finding 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court must hold a new trial, this 
time with representation free from constitutional error.50 Courts are 
reluctant to set too high a threshold for the minimum standard of 
representation, fearing a flood of new trials would follow. Lawyers may 
therefore infer erroneously that they are obligated to do no more than 
avoid a conflict that would lead to a new trial. As the Supreme Court has 
emphasized repeatedly, however, another reason for not 
constitutionalizing the law of professional responsibility is that the legal 
profession is an independent, self-governing institution.51 If defense 
lawyers are thankful that federal courts applying the Sixth Amendment 
are not micromanaging their conduct in representing clients, they must 
understand the basis for that deference, which is the courts’ expectation 
that lawyers will comply with norms established by the profession itself. 
                                                                                                                     
 49. This is true even if the defense lawyer is a public defender in a large office. Due to large 
caseloads and systemic under-funding of the indigent defense, even large defender organizations 
do not have anything approaching the conflict-compliance procedures used in the civil litigation 
context. See, e.g., Barton & Bibas, supra note 29, at 972–77. 
 50.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 6(12) (AM. LAW INST. 
2000) (listing “granting a new trial” as a potential remedy for a lawyer’s breach of a duty to a 
client).  
 51. See, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 (1986) (holding that constitutionalizing 
the Rules of Professional Conduct would be “intrud[ing] into the state’s proper authority to define 
and apply the standards of professional conduct applicable to those it admits to practice in its 
courts”).   
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As discussed below,52 those norms are embodied in state rules of 
professional conduct, based in every jurisdiction (except California) on 
the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Model Rules.53 They apply to all 
lawyers, regardless of the context in which they practice, and not only 
provide the grounds for potential professional discipline (disbarment, 
suspension, reprimand, etc.), but also state the profession’s own vision of 
what constitutes ethical conduct.54 
Courts, in turn, need to be aware of the mess they make when they fail 
to consider the interaction among seemingly separate, but in fact related, 
sources of professional guidance. For example, the Court in Mickens 
created considerable uncertainty over the application of the presumption 
of prejudice in Cuyler to conflicts of interest other than concurrent-
representation conflicts. Writing for the Court, Justice Antonin Scalia 
observed: 
The purpose of our Holloway and [Cuyler] exceptions from 
the ordinary requirements of Strickland, however, is not to 
enforce the Canons of Legal Ethics, but to apply needed 
prophylaxis in situations where Strickland itself is evidently 
inadequate to assure vindication of the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. In resolving this case on the 
grounds on which it was presented to us, we do not rule upon 
the need for the Sullivan prophylaxis in cases of successive 
representation.55 
Never mind that the “Canons of Legal Ethics” have not been in effect 
in any jurisdiction since the adoption of disciplinary rules based on the 
ABA’s Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code) in the 
early 1970s.56 Justice Scalia blurred the distinction between the 
                                                                                                                     
 52. See infra p. 17 and note 84.  
 53. See infra note 84. 
 54. Because the Model Rules are intended to apply to all lawyers, further specification of 
duties may be required in specialized areas of practice. Under the auspices of the ABA, 
committees of experienced lawyers, judges, and law professors produce commentary or guidelines 
that show how the general duties stated in the Model Rules apply in particular contexts. See, e.g., 
Lawrence J. Fox, Capital Guidelines and Ethical Duties: Mutually Reinforcing Responsibilities, 
36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 775, 776 (2008) (explaining how the ABA’s capital defense counsel 
guidelines are derived from duties stated in the Model Rules).  
 55. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 176 (4th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). 
 56. See HAZARD, supra note 32, § 1.11, at 1-21. The ABA promulgated the Canons of Ethics 
in 1908. Id. § 1.10, at 1-20. They had only precatory effect, except to the extent they overlapped 
with the common law governing lawyers. Id. § 1.10, at 1-20 to -21. “[T]hey were not adopted or 
re-promulgated by the courts as law.” Id. The most charitable interpretation of Justice Scalia’s 
dismissal of the rules of professional conduct, supported by his reference to the Canons, is that he 
was thinking of this long-outdated list of aspirations. It is perfectly clear today, however, that the 
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successive-representation conflicts rule, which itself is a prophylactic rule 
designed to protect the client’s reasonable expectation of the former 
lawyer’s loyalty and confidentiality,57 and the prophylactic application of 
the presumption of prejudice. It may be that there was no Sixth 
Amendment violation because the conflict of interest had no effect on the 
representation.58 That does not mean, however, that Mickens’ lawyer did 
not have a conflict of interest. He had previously represented the victim 
in an unrelated criminal matter59 and, as a result, almost certainly learned 
confidential information that he was professionally obligated to keep 
secret. He also may have felt a residual sense of loyalty to his former 
client, which might have made it more difficult to pursue certain avenues 
in defense of his present client. The effect on the representation may not 
have risen to the level of an “actual conflict of interest [that] adversely 
affected [the] lawyer’s performance,” as required to trigger the 
presumption of prejudice under Cuyler60 (although there are strong 
arguments that it did), but it may nevertheless have been a sufficiently 
serious interference with the lawyer’s duties to require him to withdraw 
from the representation and permit the defendant to secure substitute 
counsel.  
All lawyers are subject to discipline for violations of the rules of 
conduct adopted in the state or states in which they are admitted to 
practice.61 State courts enact these rules pursuant to the inherent power 
of the state judiciary to regulate the practice of law in the territorial 
jurisdiction of the state.62 They not only represent the views of the 
                                                                                                                     
Model Rules are “set forth in the manner of a true code—mandatory conduct rules, without the 
‘softening’ addition of hortatory provisions that were meant to inspire rather than coerce.” Id. 
§ 1.12, at 1-21. 
 57. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). 
 58. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 179 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Specifically, Mickens involved 
a defense attorney assigned to represent a minor on assault and concealed-weapon charges. Id. at 
164 (majority opinion). The appointed attorney met with the client one time for between fifteen 
and thirty minutes. Id. Within the week, the minor client was murdered. Id. at 164–65. The minor 
defendant’s initial lawyer was subsequently appointed as defense counsel for the man accused of 
the forcible sodomy and murder of his former client. Id.   
 59. See id. at 164. 
 60. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980). 
 61. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.5(a). 
 62. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 1 cmt. b (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000). The Restatement is a significant source of authority in the law of professional 
responsibility because it attempts to unify the principles expressed in the state rules of professional 
conduct with generally applicable norms of tort, contract, agency, procedure, and other law that 
bear on the conduct of lawyers. For example, provisions respecting conflicts of interest take into 
account not only cases imposing discipline for representing a client while subject to a conflict, 
but also cases involving disqualification by a court from the representation of a client due to 
conflicts of interest, which is technically an aspect of a different inherent power of a tribunal—
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organized profession concerning the ethical obligations of lawyers, but 
also are enforceable through state disciplinary procedures.63 As the 
Supreme Court explained in Strickland,64 defense lawyers are also 
obligated by their clients’ Sixth Amendment rights to provide effective 
assistance of counsel.65 A lawyer owes the client a duty of objectively 
reasonable performance, as measured by prevailing professional norms.66 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing for the Court in Strickland, 
suggested that rules of professional conduct adopted by state courts are 
one source of guidance for determining the content of these norms.67 At 
the same time, however, she cautioned against a per se equivalence 
between the constitutionally guaranteed effective assistance of counsel 
and conduct that was mandatory under state disciplinary rules: 
No particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can 
satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances 
faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions 
regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant. Any 
such set of rules would interfere with the constitutionally 
protected independence of counsel and restrict the wide 
latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions.68 
The ideal of the bar as an independent institution, to which Justice 
O’Connor appeals, has deep historical roots,69 and it is understandable 
that at the time she authored Strickland she did not wish to involve the 
Court in establishing detailed guidelines for competent representation. 
However, the language in numerous ineffective assistance of counsel 
                                                                                                                     
the power to regulate the conduct of litigation in that court. See id. § 1 cmt. c; WOLFRAM, supra 
note 32, § 2.2.4, at 31–32 (distinguishing a trial court’s inherent authority to regulate the conduct 
of lawyers appearing before the tribunal from the inherent power of the judiciary more broadly to 
regulate the legal profession). Disqualification is an equitable remedy imposed by courts to protect 
the integrity of its proceedings. Because it is an equitable remedy, however, and because not all 
participants in a litigated matter may have standing to raise a conflict of interest in a motion to 
disqualify, disqualification cases may diverge in important ways from cases imposing 
professional discipline or, for that matter, from cases involving lawsuits by clients for malpractice 
or breach of fiduciary duty arising out of a conflict-burdened representation. The Restatement 
does an admirable job of unifying these diverse sources of normative authority into a relatively 
coherent body of law—the law governing lawyers.  
 63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5(1). 
 64. 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).  
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 688. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 688–89. 
 69. See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1988) 
(chronicling the historical meaning of professional independence and how lawyers have “pursued 
their vision of independence in their practices”). 
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cases decided since Strickland has created unnecessary confusion with 
respect to the relationship between the rules of professional conduct and 
the constitutional minimum for competent performance by defense 
counsel. In particular, some Justices seem to have contributed to an 
attitude among judges and lawyers that the state rules of professional 
conduct are inferior to other sources of guidance for lawyers. At the very 
least, the Court has not been consistent in the attitude it expresses toward 
state disciplinary rules, which may have had the unfortunate result of 
tacitly suggesting to defense lawyers that the rules are unimportant.  
Consider Nix v. Whiteside.70 In that case, after the defendant suddenly 
changed his account of how a killing took place, the defense lawyer told 
his client that if the client insisted on taking the stand and testifying 
falsely, it would be counsel’s duty to inform the court that he felt his 
client was committing perjury and to seek to withdraw.71 The client 
subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that his 
lawyer’s refusal to allow him to testify to the second version of events 
deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel.72 Applying the 
performance prong of Strickland, the Court reiterated that prevailing 
professional norms are the yardstick for measuring competent 
representation.73 Significantly, it distinguished between what state rules 
of professional conduct might require, on the one hand, and what the 
Sixth Amendment might require on the other: 
Under the Strickland standard, breach of an ethical standard 
does not necessarily make out a denial of the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel. When 
examining attorney conduct, a court must be careful not to 
narrow the wide range of conduct acceptable under the Sixth 
Amendment so restrictively as to constitutionalize particular 
standards of professional conduct and thereby intrude into 
the state’s proper authority to define and apply the standards 
of professional conduct applicable to those it admits to 
practice in its courts.74  
                                                                                                                     
 70. 475 U.S. 157 (1986). 
 71. Id. at 161. 
 72. Id. at 162. 
 73. Id. at 165. 
 74. Id. The Court’s use of the term “ethical standard” here, while familiar enough, is 
potentially misleading because state rules of professional conduct are legally enforceable rules of 
positive law, not merely statements of what a good lawyer ought to do. See LIAM MURPHY, WHAT 
MAKES LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 23–24 (2014) (defining positive law 
as that which can be ascertained without moral deliberation about what the law ought to be). There 
are many different ways to understand the word “ethics.” The ABA Model Code distinguished 
between statements of best practices that were not intended to constitute enforceable rules, called 
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The Court then set out a summary of the duties of counsel, as a matter 
of the state rules of professional conduct, for when a criminal defendant 
announces the intention to testify falsely.75 Here is where the Justices’ 
discussion of the applicable standards of professional conduct subtly 
diverge, showing the importance of the Court’s attitude toward the 
disciplinary rules. 
Chief Justice Warren Burger, writing for the majority, stated that “an 
attorney’s revelation of his client’s perjury to the court is a professionally 
responsible and acceptable response to the conduct of a client who has 
actually given perjured testimony.”76 That would be true today. The 
Model Rules arguably permit the lawyer’s conduct in Whiteside—sternly 
admonishing the client to tell the truth and informing him of counsel’s 
duties to inform the court and withdraw from representation in the event 
of perjury.77 The defense lawyer’s conduct would therefore be within 
                                                                                                                     
Ethical Considerations (ECs), and enforceable, black-letter rules, called Disciplinary Rules (DRs), 
stating minimum standards of conduct, the violation of which would subject an attorney to 
discipline. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY PRELIMINARY STATEMENT (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 1980). This distinction corresponds with what Professor Lon Fuller called the “morality of 
aspiration” and the “morality of duty,” respectively. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 
5–6 (1964). As Professor David Luban points out, this is an idiosyncratic use of the idea of 
morality. See DAVID LUBAN, Natural Law as Professional Ethics: A Reading of Fuller, in LEGAL 
ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 99, 105 (2007). Philosophers generally use “ethics” and “morality” 
interchangeably, although a few philosophers have attempted to argue for a distinction. See, e.g., 
BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 6 (1985). The important distinction 
for the purposes of the ethics and conduct of lawyers is between (1) norms that take the form of 
enforceable standards, potentially subjecting lawyers to some form of legal sanctions, including 
professional discipline (disbarment, suspension, reprimand, etc.), civil liability, or a finding of 
constitutional ineffectiveness, and (2) norms that make rational demands on any moral agent, 
including those acting in a professional capacity, and thus establish standards for the evaluation 
of conduct as right or wrong irrespective of law. For example, one might contend that it is wrong 
in ethical terms to dedicate one’s skill and training as a lawyer to prevent the extradition to Israel 
of an accused concentration camp guard, while conceding that there is no legal prohibition on 
doing so. See Monroe H. Freedman, Must You Be the Devil’s Advocate?, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 23, 
1993, at 19, reprinted in MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ 
ETHICS app. A, at 371 (4th ed. 2010). While the term “legal ethics” is often understood as 
equivalent to the law governing lawyers or the state rules of professional conduct, to preserve 
analytical clarity, this Article does not use it in this way.  
 75. Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 166–68. 
 76. Id. at 170. 
 77. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (“If a lawyer 
knows that the client intends to testify falsely . . . the lawyer should seek to persuade the client 
[and] . . . [i]f the persuasion is ineffective . . . the lawyer must refuse to offer the false evidence.”). 
The lawyer may have misapplied the rules, however, by concluding that the client intended to 
testify falsely, based on the client changing his story and saying that, based on other cases that 
argued self defense, “If I don't say I saw a gun, I'm dead.” Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 161. The duties 
imposed on lawyers with respect to false testimony are triggered only when the lawyer knows the 
testimony will be false. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 6. Knowledge is a defined 
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prevailing norms of professional conduct under the Model Rules, which 
are now the basis for the rules of professional conduct in forty-nine states 
and the District of Columbia.78 Complicating the analysis, however, 
Chief Justice Burger apparently misunderstood the Model Code, a 
version of which was then in effect in Iowa.79 The Model Code handled 
the problem of perjury in an awkward, roundabout way. In contrast with 
the Model Rules, which have a specific rule for witness perjury and an 
explicit priority of duties between candor to the tribunal and maintaining 
client confidences,80 the Model Code treated the professional response to 
client perjury as an instance of the general problem of assisting client 
crimes and of disclosing confidential information to prevent future 
crimes.81 Because it handled the problem in this way, it created ambiguity 
                                                                                                                     
term in the Model Rules and refers to actual (subjective) knowledge. Id. r. 1.0(f). Court decisions 
occasionally underscore that knowledge really does mean knowledge. See, e.g., State v. 
McDowell, 681 N.W.2d 500, 518–19 (Wis. 2004) (defining knowledge of intended perjury as 
knowledge “based on the client’s expressed admission of intent to testify untruthfully”) (emphasis 
added). 
 78. See CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_pr
ofessional_conduct.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2016). California remains a holdout, with a hybrid 
system based on its own rules of professional conduct and various provisions of the California 
Business & Professions Code. See CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1-100(A) (STATE 
BAR OF CAL. 2014). 
 79. See Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 167–68. Additionally, lawyers sometimes misunderstand the 
lack of authority of the ABA Model Code and Model Rules. The word “model” is not used for 
nothing. Committees of the ABA, consisting of lawyers, judges, and academics, propose rules of 
professional conduct that states can be adopt, but the ABA models have no force until the highest 
court of a state adopts them. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 1 
cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2000). Professional responsibility scholars may speak informally of duties 
under the Model Rules, but it is well established that the binding rules are those adopted by the 
state’s highest court. See id. This is not merely a pedantic distinction, as state courts may vary the 
content of the rules from the ABA versions. As a general rule, the more controversial an issue is 
in the law of lawyering, the more state-by-state variation can be expected.  
 80. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(c) (stating that the duties in Rule 3.3 apply 
even where compliance would require disclosure of information protected by the duty of 
confidentiality in Rule 1.6). The rule requires the lawyer to refuse to offer evidence known to be 
false and to take “reasonable remedial measures” if the lawyer later comes to learn of the falsity 
of evidence previously offered. Id. r. 3.3(a)(3). Those remedial measures include first trying to 
persuade the witness not to testify falsely or to correct previously given false testimony but may 
ultimately include disclosure to the tribunal of the perjury. Id. r. 3.3 cmt. [10]. 
 81. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(4) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) 
(“[A] lawyer shall not . . . [k]nowingly use perjured testimony”). As compared with the Model 
Rules, this provision is troublesome because it does not provide guidance to a lawyer confronted 
with a client, such as Emanuel Whiteside, who is apparently determined to testify falsely. The 
attorney’s duty of confidentiality would cover the communication from the client to the lawyer in 
which the client expresses an intention to lie on the stand. In Whiteside, the client stated that he 
believed that if he did not testify to having seen a gun, he would not be successful in claiming 
self-defense. 475 U.S. at 161. What should the lawyer do in that case? The Model Code did allow 
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concerning the permissibility of revealing false testimony after the fact, 
as permitted by the Model Rules.82 Chief Justice Burger seemed 
unimpressed with this technical distinction—which of course would be 
highly significant to a lawyer seeking to avoid professional discipline—
and relied instead on the proposition that a lawyer’s permissible actions 
are limited to “legitimate, lawful conduct compatible with the very nature 
of a trial as a search for truth.”83 
Justice William Brennan wrote separately to emphasize that the 
decision established only the proposition that if a lawyer complies with 
the state rules of professional conduct regarding client perjury, then the 
lawyer’s representation could not be constitutionally ineffective.84 The 
case does not stand for the rule that a lawyer is constitutionally required 
to dissuade a client from committing perjury, disclose it to the court, or 
take any other specific steps if he knows a client intends to testify 
falsely.85 Justice Brennan reminded lawyers that “the Court’s essay 
regarding what constitutes the correct response to a criminal client’s 
suggestion that he will perjure himself is pure discourse without force of 
law.”86  
 
                                                                                                                     
a lawyer to disclose “[t]he intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary 
to prevent the crime.” MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3). Because perjury 
is a crime, Whiteside’s lawyer would have been permitted to disclose the client’s stated intention 
to testify falsely. The lawyer would also have been permitted, and perhaps required, to withdraw 
if the continued representation would result in a violation of a disciplinary rule or would constitute 
an illegal course of conduct; perjury, a crime, would satisfy those requirements. See id. DR 2-
110(B)(2), (C)(1)(b), (C)(2). 
 82. On its face the Model Code seemed to require, not merely to permit, after-the-fact 
revelation of client perjury. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (“A 
lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that . . . [h]is client has, in the course of 
representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to 
rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the 
affected person or tribunal, except when the information is protected as a privileged 
communication.”). Note the last clause – “except when . . . protected as a privileged 
communication.” Lawyer knowledge of client perjury is likely to come from a confidential 
attorney-client communication and thus be within the protection of the attorney-client privilege. 
But the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics, in Formal Opinion 341 (1975), stated that the 
“except” clause should be read more broadly, as emcompassing both “secrets” (that is, 
information protected by the duty of confidentiality) as well as attorney-client privileged 
communications. What DR 7-102(B)(1) seemed to create as a retrospective duty to disclose client 
perjury was thus completely undercut by the “except” clause and its interpretation by the ABA 
Committee. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 133–
44 (2d ed. 2002) (recounting this history).  
 83. Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 166. 
 84. See id. at 177 (Brennan, J., concurring).  
 85. See id.  
 86. Id. 
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It is important to see that Whiteside does not stand for the principle 
that there is no relationship between the state rules of professional 
conduct and the Sixth Amendment. It is true that not all violations of the 
rules of professional conduct give rise to a claim for ineffective assistance 
of counsel, just as not all conduct in violation of the rules gives rise to a 
malpractice claim. It could be the case, however, consistent with 
Whiteside, that a violation of the state disciplinary rules also violates the 
performance prong of Strickland. That is an open question after 
Strickland and Whiteside. What is remarkable about Whiteside, 
considered in the context of subsequent Supreme Court cases, is how 
seriously some of the Justices took the state rules of professional conduct. 
Justice Burger’s majority opinion traced the history of the rule on client 
perjury from the 1908 Canons of Ethics, through the 1969 Model Code, 
to the 1983 Model Rules, noting that the disciplinary rules had always 
imposed some duty on counsel to avoid introducing perjured testimony 
or other false evidence.87 The majority analyzed a lawyer’s duty under 
the Model Rules and Model Code and stated without hedging that “under 
no circumstance may a lawyer either advocate or passively tolerate a 
client’s giving false testimony.”88 The Court seems to have been saying 
that the disciplinary rules—the then-existing Iowa Code of Professional 
Responsibility—are consistent with the defense lawyer’s duties under the 
Sixth Amendment, and therefore there can be no constitutional 
ineffectiveness in a representation in which the lawyer follows rules that 
apparently coincide with a plausible constitutional vision of the defense 
lawyer’s role.89  
Justice Harry Blackmun was, if anything, more deferential to state 
rules of professional conduct.90 He saw the problem of the proper 
professional response to client perjury as a difficult one, calling for the 
exercise of judgment and consideration of a number of factors that are 
likely to differ case-by-case.91 A “blanket rule” adopted by the Court 
would unnecessarily limit the flexibility states have to adopt rules that 
reflect differing approaches to the perjury problem.92 For that reason, 
Justice Blackmun thought the primary source of norms governing the 
conduct of criminal defense lawyers ought to be the state disciplinary 
rules.93 Federalism concerns substantially drove Justice Blackmun’s 
opinion, leading him to conclude that the Sixth Amendment is, in a sense, 
                                                                                                                     
 87. Id. at 166–68 (majority opinion). 
 88. Id. at 171. 
 89. See id. at 175.  
 90. See id. at 189–90 (Blackmun, J., concurring).  
 91. Id. at 188–89. 
 92. Id. at 189.  
 93. See id. at 189–90.  
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subordinated to the inherent authority of state courts to regulate the legal 
profession.94 
In subsequent cases, however, some Justices have sought to drive a 
wedge between the Sixth Amendment and other norms of professional 
conduct, implicitly subordinating the latter. For example, in Holland v. 
Florida,95 a lawyer was appointed to represent a death row inmate in 
filing a federal habeas corpus petition.96 The lawyer failed to file the 
petition within the one-year statute of limitations prescribed by the 
AEDPA.97 The Court held that the statute was equitably tolled due to the 
extraordinary circumstance of the lawyer’s failure to satisfy applicable 
professional standards of care.98 As a matter of state law, the lawyer’s 
misconduct went far beyond “garden variety” negligence and constituted 
a violation of fundamental standards of professional responsibility.99 
Ironically, Justice Scalia, who was ordinarily inclined to give states room 
to regulate without excessive intrusion by federal courts,100 dissented in 
Holland, arguing that the majority had failed to identify a standard under 
which the lawyer’s performance was grossly negligent.101 Justice Scalia 
stated, “The only thing the Court offers that approaches substantive 
instruction is its implicit approval of ‘fundamental canons of professional 
responsibility,’ articulated by an ad hoc group of legal-ethicist amici 
consisting mainly of professors of that least analytically rigorous and 
hence most subjective of law-school subjects, legal ethics.”102  
 The sources relied upon by the Court majority—the Model Rules and 
the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, which were in 
effect in Florida and applicable to the lawyer’s representation of the 
petitioner103—self-evidently do not state subjective standards. A 
subjective standard would approve of a lawyer’s conduct as long as he 
                                                                                                                     
 94. See id.  
 95. 560 U.S. 631 (2010). 
 96. Id. at 635–66.  
 97. Id. at 635, 643 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)–(2) (2012)). 
 98. Id. at 649. 
 99. Id. at 652–53 (citing Brief of Legal Ethics Professors et al. as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Petitioner, Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) (No. 09-5327), 2009 WL 5177143). One 
of the authors of this Article was a signatory on the amicus brief. 
 100. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (stating that the Due Process Clause does not provide substantive protection against 
excessive punitive damages awards); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 576–78 (1996) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (urging deference to state policy in favor of single-sex education at Virginia 
Military Institute); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 598–99 (1996) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (stating that the Due Process Clause is not a “secret repository of substantive 
guarantees against ‘unfairness’”).  
 101. Holland, 560 U.S. at 670 (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 652–53 (majority opinion).  
 
22
Florida Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 7
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol68/iss3/7
2016] CAPITAL POST-CONVICTION REPRESENTATION 787 
 
“acted honestly and bona fide to the best of his own judgment.”104 An 
objective standard, on the other hand, requires lawyers to measure up to 
the standards set by others within the profession. These standards are 
objective to the extent there is something other than the lawyer’s own 
best efforts that can be used to determine whether the lawyer’s 
performance was adequate.105 Indeed, the brief brushed aside by Justice 
Scalia discussed objective duties of competence, communication, and 
loyalty grounded in tort, agency, and constitutional law, as well as the 
rules of professional conduct.106  
Justice Scalia knew the difference between objective and subjective 
standards, and he was perfectly well acquainted with the use of custom 
to establish standards of care in other contexts, so his dismissal reflected 
either a substantive disagreement with the content of the standards 
established by the rules or an annoyance that state courts have adopted 
standards of professional conduct that require lawyers to take their 
fiduciary duties to clients seriously. But the opinion also reflects a reverse 
of the subordination described by Justice Blackmun in Whiteside. Rather 
than federal courts deferring to state disciplinary rules to preserve 
flexibility and a variety of responses to a problem of professional ethics, 
Justice Scalia wished to oust the authority of state courts and disciplinary 
rules and to replace them with a blanket federal constitutional rule that 
licensed gross negligence by defense counsel. The trouble with this 
reverse-subordination move is that it is inconsistent with the principle in 
Strickland that the legal profession’s prevailing norms set the standard 
for effective assistance of counsel. Justice O’Connor’s opinion in 
Strickland cautioned courts not to create rigid guidelines for defense 
lawyers and also warned against judging in hindsight, but it did so while 
emphasizing that courts should look to the profession to flesh out the 
required standard of care: 
                                                                                                                     
 104. Cf. Vaughan v. Menlove (1837), 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493; 3 Bing. (N.C.) 468, 474–75 
(rejecting this approach to duties of reasonable care in tort law). 
 105. Every first-year torts student is familiar with the distinction drawn by then-Judge Oliver 
Wendell Holmes between a person doing the best he is able and the standard of conduct that the 
law requires: 
If . . . a man is born hasty and awkward, is always having accidents and hurting 
himself or his neighbors, no doubt his congenital defects will be allowed for in 
the courts of Heaven, but his slips are no less troublesome to his neighbors than 
if they sprang from guilty neglect. His neighbors accordingly require him, at his 
proper peril, to come up to their standard . . . . 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 108 (1881). 
 106. See Brief of Legal Ethics Professors et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 
supra note 99. 
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Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar 
Association standards and the like are guides to determining 
what is reasonable, but they are only guides. No particular 
set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily 
take account of the variety of circumstances faced by 
defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions 
regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant. Any 
such set of rules would interfere with the constitutionally 
protected independence of counsel and restrict the wide 
latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions. 
Indeed, the existence of detailed guidelines for 
representation could distract counsel from the overriding 
mission of vigorous advocacy of the defendant’s cause.107 
It is clear that the Strickland analysis is intended to protect the 
independence of the legal profession to define its own standards of 
conduct, not to deny the practical authority of rules of professional 
conduct for lawyers.108  
Other Justices devalue the rules of professional conduct through 
benign neglect. In Maples v. Thomas,109 for example, two pro bono 
lawyers at Sullivan & Cromwell simply stopped working on their client’s 
state post-conviction review case, leading to a procedural default on the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim he subsequently brought in a 
federal habeas corpus petition.110 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted that 
by not seeking the permission of the trial court to withdraw as counsel of 
record, the lawyers violated an Alabama rule of criminal procedure.111 
Their conduct also violated the state disciplinary rules, which allow 
withdrawal of an attorney only if the withdrawal “can be accomplished 
without material adverse effect on the interests of the client” or if the 
attorney otherwise has good cause, and if the attorney obtains the court’s 
permission.112 This is not merely a technical quibble, but rather a 
distinction that could make a difference in the evaluation of the attorneys’ 
conduct. The lawyers were first required to satisfy themselves that one of 
seven alternative grounds for permissive withdrawal existed.113 As it 
happens, there was no basis for permissive withdrawal—the attorneys 
                                                                                                                     
 107. Id. at 688–89 (citations omitted). 
 108. See id. at 688 (“These basic duties neither exhaustively define the obligations of counsel 
nor form a checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney performance.”).  
 109. 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012). 
 110. Id. at 916–18.  
 111. Id. at 919.  
 112. See ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16 (2015) (“When a lawyer has been 
appointed to represent a client, withdrawal ordinarily requires approval of the appointing 
authority.”). 
 113. See ALA. RULES r. 1.16(b).  
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simply disregarded their obligation under the disciplinary rule. It may be 
that this violation did not rise to the level of constitutionally ineffective 
representation under the first prong of Strickland,114 but an obvious point 
sometimes gets overlooked: the petitioner would not have defaulted on 
his federal habeas petition if his attorneys at Sullivan & Cromwell had 
complied with their obligation under the state rules of professional 
conduct.  
In other cases, the Court has stressed that it relies on defense lawyers 
to comply with their obligations under the disciplinary rules. For 
example, with regard to conflicts of interest,  
Defense counsel have an ethical obligation to avoid 
conflicting representations and to advise the court promptly 
when a conflict of interest arises during the course of trial. 
Absent special circumstances, therefore, trial courts may 
assume either that multiple representation entails no conflict 
or that the lawyer and his clients knowingly accept such risk 
of conflict as may exist.115 
As the Court rightly noted, lawyers are in a better position to detect 
and handle conflicts of interest, either by obtaining the informed consent 
of their clients or by informing the court and seeking release from the 
representation.116 If courts are going to rely on lawyers’ compliance with 
the rules, for understandable reasons such as minimizing information 
costs, then they should be careful not to send mixed messages about their 
importance. 
Regardless of whether the Court’s treatment of the state rules of 
professional conduct reflects neglect or outright hostility, it is worrisome 
that criminal defense lawyers may hear the message that the rules are 
lower-status law and can be ignored whenever compliance is 
inconvenient. One may certainly criticize the content of some rules for 
being self-serving or insufficiently rigorous. Critics of the ABA have 
long contended that the rules do more to protect the legal profession’s 
                                                                                                                     
 114. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (“First, the defendant must 
show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors 
so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment.”). 
 115. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346–47 (1980) (footnote omitted). 
 116. Id. at 346–47 (“An ‘attorney representing two defendants in a criminal matter is in the 
best position professionally and ethically to determine when a conflict of interest exists or will 
probably develop in the course of a trial.’” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Holloway 
v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 485 (1978))). 
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monopoly than to safeguard the public interest,117 and that other 
institutions, such as legislatures and administrative agencies, may be 
better situated to address certain types of professional misconduct than 
the profession itself.118 For the most part, however, the rules represent a 
coherent, normatively attractive vision of ethical lawyering. The rules 
emphasize the highly fiduciary nature of the lawyer–client relationship, 
state strict duties of loyalty, and require a reasonable degree of 
competence, diligence, and communication with clients.119 Certainly if 
the legal profession values its independence from intrusive oversight by 
courts, legislatures, and regulatory agencies, lawyers have a reason to 
follow the rules that they, as an organized profession, have adopted as a 
quid pro quo for a monopoly over the provision of legal services. It is 
understandable that courts do not want to create rigid, inflexible norms 
of professional conduct under the guise of interpreting the Sixth 
Amendment’s right to effective assistance of counsel. But the duties 
stated in the rules do not disappear merely because there may be no 
federal habeas corpus remedy as a result of their violation. As the rules 
themselves remind courts, the law generally does, and should, presuppose 
voluntary compliance.120  
Voluntary compliance is even more important when the profession 
claims the prerogative of self-regulation. Of course, the legal profession 
is not really self-regulating: American lawyers are subject to various 
court-administered sanctions for violations of professional standards, 
                                                                                                                     
 117. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. 
REV. 639, 655, 658 (1981); Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective 
on Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. REV. 689, 697–98, 704 (1981). 
 118. For example, Professor Susan Koniak understands the history of lawyers’ involvement 
in numerous financial scandals to reveal the ABA’s inability to promulgate effective rules for the 
protection of investors. See Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly’s Done: The Bar’s Struggle 
with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1236, 1238 (2003) (asserting that the ABA’s battles with the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have “[left] lawyers free to continue helping 
major corporations deceive the investing public”). The problem Professor Koniak considered 
involves an assertion by the profession of a norm—a near-absolute duty of confidentiality—that 
conflicts with a more pro-disclosure norm favored by the SEC, Congress (in the Sarbanes–Oxley 
Act), and many state courts applying the common law of fraud. See Susan P. Koniak, The Law 
Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389, 1427, 1462 (1992). The cases on ineffective 
assistance of counsel, by contrast, generally do not involve a conflict between the norms supported 
by the legal profession and those preferred by other institutions. Instead, they involve the frequent 
failure of both institutions to take these norms seriously.  
 119. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT rr. 1.1 (competence), 1.3 (diligence), 1.4 
cmt. 1 (communication), 1.7 cmt. 1 (loyalty) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). 
 120. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 16 (“Compliance with the Rules, as 
with all law in an open society, depends primarily upon understanding and voluntary compliance, 
secondarily upon reinforcement by peer and public opinion and finally, when necessary, upon 
enforcement through disciplinary proceedings.”).  
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including contempt of court, money damages for negligence, 
disqualification from representation, and disgorgement of earned fees.121 
Similarly, it is a misstatement—common enough, but inaccurate 
nonetheless—to assert that the prevailing customs and norms of the legal 
profession set the standard of effective representation under the Sixth 
Amendment.122 Uncritical deference to prevailing practices may have the 
effect of ratifying incompetent representation.123 Yet Justice O’Connor 
was right to be concerned about the independence of the legal profession 
from excessive regulation by the judiciary.124 The truth of the matter is 
that the judiciary and the legal profession gradually establish standards 
of effective representation in a back-and-forth process. As Justice John 
Paul Stevens wrote in Padilla v. Kentucky,125 the constitutional standard 
depends upon “the practice and expectation of the legal community,” and 
the profession’s own internal norms, including the rules of professional 
conduct, are not conclusive authority but guides to assessing 
competence.126 This means that when the Supreme Court establishes an 
important new legal principle, as it did in Martinez,127 it may take awhile 
for the legal profession to adjust to the change. Post-conviction lawyers 
need to identify the ethical obligations required in light of the holding in 
Martinez that ineffective assistance of counsel in state post-conviction 
proceedings may serve as cause to excuse what would otherwise be a 
procedural default. Courts must also work through the ramifications of 
Martinez. For example, given the responsibility of counsel to identify 
conflicts and bring them to the attention of the court,128 are courts 
warranted in continuing to rely on lawyers when there are reasons to 
believe that the lawyer’s prior negligence is the source of the conflict? As 
the following Part shows, lawyers outside the criminal defense context 
                                                                                                                     
 121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 6 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 122. See Russell Stetler & W. Bradley Wendel, The ABA Guidelines and the Norms of 
Capital Defense Representation, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 635, 651–53 (2013) (arguing that in 
ineffective assistance of counsel cases, “courts should look to what actors should do as opposed 
to what they sometimes do in fact”). 
 123. Id. at 663–64. 
 124. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688–89 (1984) (“Any such set of rules 
would interfere with the constitutionally protected independence of counsel and restrict the wide 
latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions.”). 
 125. 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
 126. Id. at 366–67. 
 127. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1320 (2012); see supra text accompanying note 17. 
 128. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 485–86 (1978) (stating that “[a]n ‘attorney 
representing two defendants in a criminal matter is in the best position professionally and ethically 
to determine when a conflict of interest exists or will probably develop in the course of a trial’” 
and that “defense attorneys have the obligation, upon discovering a conflict of interests, to advise 
the court at once of the problem” (quoting State v. Davis, 514 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Ariz. 1973) (en 
banc))). 
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have long struggled with the conflicts of interest that arise from credible 
allegations of their own incompetence within an ongoing professional 
relationship.129 Courts working their way through the puzzle of Martinez 
may find these approaches instructive as far as they go, keeping in mind 
that the unique features of capital defense representation may limit their 
utility. 
II.  “PRIOR WORK” CONFLICTS IN THEIR NATURAL ENVIRONMENT 
Martinez is implicated when a lawyer representing a petitioner in 
federal habeas proceedings also represented that person in state post-
conviction proceedings.130 If the lawyer unreasonably failed to raise a 
meritorious claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in the state 
courts, then counsel’s deficient performance can excuse the procedural 
default for failing to raise the claim in the right court at the right time.131 
As discussed above, this failure can satisfy the “cause” requirement, 
which allows federal courts to adjudicate otherwise procedurally barred 
claims.132 Given Martinez’s creation of a new path to a merits review of 
previously barred claims, attorneys representing petitioners in federal 
habeas corpus proceedings—who were also state post-conviction 
counsel—are now required to assess the quality of their prior 
representation. This assessment involves taking into account the potential 
benefits to the client of continuity of representation, including counsel’s 
familiarity with the record and any hard-won relationship of trust that 
may have developed between the client and lawyer.  
Setting aside the constitutional framework for judging the 
performance of counsel, as well as the complexities of procedural default 
under AEDPA, what would a “pure” analysis look like under the state 
rules of professional conduct? To help answer this question, imagine a 
situation roughly analogous to the Martinez dilemma, only in the context 
of the representation of a client in civil litigation. A common version of 
this scenario involves a law firm that represented a client in a 
transactional, advising, or regulatory matter and subsequently attempted 
to represent the client in litigation in which resolution of one of the issues 
in dispute implicates the advice given by the firm or the actions it had 
recommended the client take.133 Other cases involve successive 
                                                                                                                     
 129. See infra text accompanying notes 137–39. 
 130. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1313.  
 131. See id. at 1315.  
 132. See id. at 1320; supra text accompanying note 17. 
 133. See, e.g., Red Zone LLC v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, 988 N.Y.S.2d 588 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2014) (statute of limitations on malpractice claim did not begin to run 
while law firm that had made mistakes in transactional representation continued to negotiate and 
litigate over the contract); St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, McLean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 
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representation in litigation.134 They all pose not only the “endgame” 
question of when a conflict of interest burdens a lawyer so much that it is 
impermissible to proceed with the representation, but also the much more 
subtle and complicated issue of how to proceed in the middle of a 
representation when either there is an allegation of incompetence or the 
lawyer comes to realize that she made a mistake that affects the client’s 
legal interests.135 
All of these so-called “prior-work” conflicts issues share a similar 
dynamic. The claim that a lawyer provided incompetent representation at 
least potentially creates a conflict between the interests of the client and 
the lawyer’s personal interest in avoiding liability, discipline, or even 
embarrassment for having been careless. The lawyer may want to take 
steps to defend her pocketbook or reputation, including resisting the 
                                                                                                                     
746 S.E.2d 98 (Ga. 2013) (analyzing intra-firm attorney-client privilege issues arising out of a 
lawsuit threat issued by a current client of the law firm in real estate matters); Koen Book Distribs. 
v. Powell, Trachtman, Logan, Carrle, Bowman & Lombardo, P.C., 212 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Pa. 
2002) (determining first whether conflict of interest related to prior representation existed before 
analyzing attorney-client privilege and work product issues); Eurocom S.A. v. Mahoney, Cohen 
& Co., 522. F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (disqualifying law firm from representing corporation 
in negligence action against accountant where law firm had allegedly also been negligent and 
firm’s negligence, if proven, would reduce the corporation’s recovery under principles of 
comparative negligence); Veras Inv. Partners LLC v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, 17 
Misc.3d 1103(A), 2007 WL 2792175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, Sept. 27, 2007) (outlining 
malpractice theory based on law firms previous advice to and subsequent representation in 
litigation of hedge fund managers). 
 134. See, e.g., Crews v. Cty. of Nassau, No. 06-CV-2610, 2007 WL 316568, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 30, 2007) (disqualifying a lawyer who had represented a criminal defendant from 
representing the same client as a plaintiff in a civil rights action because the lawyer’s personal 
interest in concealing alleged errors in the underlying criminal action posed a “significant risk of 
trial taint” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Glueck v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 653 F.2d 
746, 748 (2d Cir. 1981))); Jamieson v. Slater, No. CV 06-1524-PHX-SMM, 2006 WL 3421788, 
at *8 (D. Ariz. Nov. 27, 2006) (holding that a non-waivable conflict exists when an attorney is a 
co-defendant with a client in a malicious prosecution lawsuit); Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, 
Halleran & Ciesla, 662 A.2d 509, 512 (N.J. 1995) (discussing a malpractice claim against a law 
firm that represented a client in litigation, made a mistake in settlement negotiations that caused 
prejudice to the client, and subsequently withdrew as counsel due to a conflict of interest), 
abrogated by Olds v. Donnelly, 696 A.2d 633 (N.J. 1997). 
 135. See, e.g., Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 113 (2005) (“When, by act or 
omission, a lawyer has made an error, and that error is likely to result in prejudice to a client’s 
right or claim, the lawyer must promptly disclose the error to the client.”); Conn. Bar Ass’n Prof’l 
Ethics Comm., Informal Op. 2014-05 (2014) (holding that no conflict of interest existed where a 
lawyer promptly communicated a mistake to the client and took steps to ameliorate it); N.Y. State 
Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Ethics Op. 734 (2000) (noting that, ordinarily, a lawyer “has 
an obligation to report to the client that [she] has made a significant error or omission that may 
give rise to a possible malpractice claim”). See generally Anthony V. Alfieri, Law Firm 
Malpractice Disclosure: Illustrations and Guidelines, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 17, 46–53 (2013) 
(discussing the “best practice guidelines applicable to law firm malpractice disclosure disputes”). 
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client’s legitimate requests for information or asserting defenses that 
claim contributory misconduct by the client; these steps may harm the 
client. The lawyer’s understandable desire to protect herself conflicts 
with the bedrock principle that a lawyer owes a fiduciary duty to the client 
at all times during the existence of an attorney–client relationship and 
must always put the client’s interests first.136 The lawyer may also 
become so preoccupied with defending against allegations of misconduct 
that the client’s case suffers from neglect. A further difficulty is that it 
may not be clear at the time whether the lawyer actually committed 
malpractice or provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Not all 
assertions of error have merit, and the lawyer may believe that her 
conduct was reasonable. Of course, if an allegation is serious and 
credible, a lawyer has a duty to inform the client of this fact, advise the 
client of the best way to protect her rights, and obtain the client’s 
informed consent to the conflict if the lawyer wishes to continue 
representing the client.137 But a lawyer need not go through the procedure 
of explaining the possible conflict and obtaining informed consent every 
time something goes wrong that an aggrieved client might characterize 
as the result of negligence. A lawyer is therefore in the unenviable 
position of having to decide how to advise her client on the client’s rights 
to assert claims regarding the lawyer’s negligence while remaining 
immersed in the ongoing representation of the client in the underlying 
matter. The lawyer’s involvement on behalf of the client makes it 
extremely difficult to adopt the necessary stance of detachment from 
which it would be possible to evaluate whether she had provided 
competent services to the client. The conflicts rules, which contemplate 
the lawyer providing independent advice to the client as part of the 
process of obtaining informed consent, are not well designed to handle a 
situation in which allegations of her own misconduct in representation 
potentially diminish the lawyer’s capacity to provide this advice. Yet, a 
per se rule of disqualification would fail to reflect the reality that many 
allegations of malpractice or ineffective assistance of counsel are not 
well-founded. At the very least a lawyer should be entitled, and 
encouraged, to seek legal advice concerning what to do in light of an 
allegation of misconduct.138 Beyond that, however, the situation becomes 
                                                                                                                     
 136. See Koen Book Distribs., 212 F.R.D. at 286 (stating that a firm’s fiduciary duty to its 
clients is paramount to the firm’s own interests). 
 137. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015); see also, e.g., Garvy 
v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP, 966 N.E.2d 523, 528 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (describing how the law firm 
advised the client to consider obtaining separate counsel due to conflicts created by malpractice 
allegations). 
 138. See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Ethics Op. 789 (2005), at ¶ 13 
(explaining that, although concurrent conflicts rule does not preclude consultation with in-house 
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considerably more murky.  
For the purposes of illustrating a civil analogue to the Martinez 
dilemma, consider the following hypothetical representation based on a 
well-known legal malpractice case.139 Lawyer represents Dealership, an 
automobile dealership, located on a parcel of land owned by Landlord. 
Dealership and Landlord have a thirty-year lease, which includes a 
provision that the parties renew the lease and renegotiate the amount of 
rent at five-year intervals. In the negotiations, Landlord proposed a 
complex formula for setting the amount of rent using the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) as published by the U.S. Department of Labor. Lawyer 
conveyed this offer to his client, President of Dealership, and President 
asked, “What do you think?” Lawyer had taken a course in law school on 
accounting for lawyers but was not otherwise trained as an accountant or 
economist. Based on his knowledge and his general inclination to trust 
Landlord, Lawyer advised his client that the proposed formula was fair. 
On behalf of Dealership, President signed the lease renewal. The next 
month, President was horrified when she discovered that Landlord had 
increased the amount of Dealership’s rent by $37,000 per month. She sent 
a copy of the lease to Dealership’s accountant, who quickly discovered 
the problem: rather than basing the amount of rent on an average of 
percentage increases in the CPI, Landlord based the new formula on 
actual increases in CPI, which had the effect of locking in temporary price 
increases. President informed Lawyer of the problem and asked for his 
advice. 
Suppose under state law there is some basis for arguing that the parties 
did not have a meeting of the minds over the formula for calculating rent 
increases. Lawyer reviews the applicable cases and concludes there is 
about a fifty-percent chance of successfully voiding the lease renewal on 
the basis of a mutual mistake in fact. Lawyer also calls Landlord to 
explore the possibility of agreeing to modify the formula for calculating 
rent increases, but Landlord tells Lawyer to pound sand.  
What should Lawyer do? Keeping in mind that the client has the 
authority to make decisions about the objectives of the representation,140 
but that a lawyer should communicate all information necessary to enable 
the client to make informed decisions about the representation,141 what 
                                                                                                                     
counsel about potential malpractice claim, a firm’s conclusion that it may have committed 
malpractice may affect its independent professional judgment and therefore be a conflict of 
interest). 
 139. Loosely based, with a few embellishments, on Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, 
Halleran & Ciesla, 662 A.2d 509, 511 (N.J. 1995). For additional analysis of this case, which is 
well known in the legal ethics and malpractice community but perhaps not elsewhere, see Nancy 
J. Moore, Implications of Circle Chevrolet for Attorney Malpractice and Attorney Ethics, 28 
RUTGERS L.J. 57 (1996). 
 140. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a).  
 141. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4(b). 
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advice should he give to the client, what alternative courses of action 
should he recommend, and how strongly should he urge the client to take 
his advice? Imagine three versions of the next chapter of the story: 
1. Ignore the Problem. Lawyer advises President that, in his 
judgment, it would be in the best interests of Dealership to 
file a declaratory judgment action seeking to void the lease 
renewal. The action would give Dealership leverage and 
likely induce Landlord to agree to a less onerous formula 
based on average CPI increases. Lawyer also recommends 
that Dealership’s accountant be involved in any future 
decisions relating to the calculation of rent payments. 
President asks, “What other options do I have?” to which 
Lawyer responds, “Pay the increased rent.” President 
reluctantly authorizes Lawyer to file the declaratory 
judgment action. 
2. The Most Conservative Approach. Lawyer is aware of 
cases stating that “an attorney who realizes he or she has 
made a mistake must immediately notify the client of the 
mistake as well as the client’s right to obtain new counsel 
and sue the attorney for negligence.”142 Lawyer calls 
President, offers to resign as counsel, and informs President 
that she has a right to retain a separate attorney and file a 
malpractice lawsuit. “Are you crazy?” responds President, 
“You have represented Dealership for years, and I am not 
about to terminate that relationship over one little mistake. 
Do what you think is best for the company.”  
3. The Lawyerly Approach. Lawyer practices in a law firm 
that is large enough to have an in-house liability, loss-
prevention, and ethics partner. Lawyer consults with Partner, 
seeking advice concerning how to proceed. Partner, who 
does not have the same direct personal involvement with the 
case that Lawyer does, asks Lawyer to describe all of the 
facts pertaining to the negotiation of the lease renewal, 
including Lawyer’s understanding of the formula for 
calculating rent. Partner also asks Lawyer to explain the 
reasoning underlying his judgment that Dealership should 
agree to the proposed rent formula. An issue arising for 
lawyers practicing in firms with in-house counsel is whether 
the attorney–client privilege protects these intra-firm 
communications from discovery.143 Dealership may want to 
                                                                                                                     
 142. Circle Chevrolet, 662 A.2d at 514. 
 143. See, e.g., St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, MacLean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 746 
S.E.2d 98, 102 (Ga. 2013); RFF Family P’ship v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 
1067–68 (Mass. 2013); Palmer v. Superior Court, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 620, 623 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014); 
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know the reasons underlying Lawyer’s advice about how it 
should proceed. However, because Lawyer has a personal 
interest in avoiding liability or discipline, he is entitled to 
obtain legal advice about how best to proceed in view of 
these risks. This is not just a technical issue; rather, it reveals 
something important about the nature of prior-work 
conflicts—the legal interests of the lawyer and client may 
diverge when there is a credible allegation of misconduct.  
In this hypothetical, it is fairly clear that Lawyer made a mistake in 
the negotiation of the lease renewal. Nevertheless, Dealership may have 
good reasons to wish to continue Lawyer’s representation, including the 
transaction costs that would result from having to locate substitute 
counsel and bring the new lawyer up to speed on the matter. Assume, 
therefore, that Dealership decided to stay with Lawyer and directed him 
to file the declaratory judgment action. With the consent of the parties, 
the judge conducted a bench trial and concluded that there was no mistake 
of fact. In her written decision, the judge stated that one element of the 
mutual mistake doctrine was the mistake by both parties or their agents 
                                                                                                                     
VersusLaw, Inc. v. Stoel Rives, LLP, 111 P.3d 866, 878 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005); TattleTale Alarm 
Sys., Inc. v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, LLP, No. 2:10-CV-226, 2011 WL 382627 (S.D. Ohio 
Feb. 3, 2011), at *1–2; Thelen Reid & Priest LLP v. Marland, No. C 06-2071 VRW, 2007 WL 
578989 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2007), at *6; Koen Book Distribs. v. Powell, Trachtman, Logan, 
Carrle, Bowman & Lombardo, 212 F.R.D. 283, 284 (E.D. Pa. 2002); Bank Brussels Lambert v. 
Credit Lyonnais (Suisse), S.A., 220 F. Supp. 2d 283, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); In re SonicBlue, Inc., 
No. 07-5082, 2008 WL 170562 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2008), at *8–9. See generally Elizabeth 
Chambliss, The Scope of In-Firm Privilege, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1721, 1723 (2005) 
(addressing “the scope of the attorney-client privilege between law firm in-house counsel and 
other members of the firm”). Under the fiduciary exception to the attorney–client privilege, first—
and highly influentially—articulated in the context of shareholder derivative actions in Garner v. 
Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1103–04 (5th Cir. 1970), a party with a fiduciary duty cannot shield 
from the beneficiary communications with a legal advisor on matters related to the fiduciary’s 
breach of duty. The prior-work conflict of the lawyer representing the client is analogous to a 
corporate manager’s breach of fiduciary duty. An alternative route to the conclusion that intra-
firm communications concerning potential malpractice are not privileged is the imputation of 
conflicts of interest to all lawyers associated in a firm. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 
1.10(a). Under a strict application of the imputation rule, the firm’s in-house lawyers—whose job 
it is to advise the firm on its own legal obligations—“have developed interests adverse to those 
of the firm’s client.” St. Simons Waterfront, 746 S.E.2d at 105. Nevertheless, many courts, 
including the highest courts in Massachusetts and Georgia, have concluded that the firm’s interest 
in receiving legal advice, which is no different from that of any other client, prevails over the 
client’s interest in obtaining information concerning the firm’s breach of its duty of care. See St. 
Simons Waterfront, 746 S.E.2d at 107–08; RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080. As the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded, a law firm may have its own interests, such as 
in the defense of litigation brought or threatened by a client, on which it is entitled to seek 
confidential legal advice, even while providing complete and candid disclosure of the facts 
relevant to the client’s interests, including communications with legal advisors. See RFF Family 
P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1076. 
 
33
Blume and Wendel: Coming to Grips With the Ethical Challenges for Capital Post-Conv
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
798 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
 
regarding a material fact. The judge noted that Lawyer had testified at 
trial (which the judge had concluded was permissible since it was a bench 
trial)144 that he had not made a mistake in reviewing the CPI formula. As 
her opinion observed, “perhaps Lawyer was motivated to minimize the 
possibility that he made a mistake by the understandable hesitation to 
admit to having been negligent in representing Dealership.” The judge 
went on to note that there may have been grounds for reforming the lease 
agreement on the basis of an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing but that Dealership had waived that claim by not asserting it in 
its complaint.    
A.  Theory of Conflict 
Under the Model Rules, a conflict of interest exists if the 
representation of a client would be materially limited by (among other 
things) a personal interest of the lawyer.145 The lawyer’s personal 
interest creates a material limitation on the representation if “there is a 
significant risk that a lawyer’s ability to consider, recommend or carry 
out an appropriate course of action for the client” will be limited by the 
lawyer’s own interests,146 including avoiding liability for malpractice or 
preserving his reputation.147 A court or disciplinary authority will 
evaluate conflicts of interest functionally.148 That is, it will ask whether 
the competing interest, such as duties owed to another client or the 
lawyer’s own interests, creates a significant likelihood of interfering with 
the lawyer’s ability to fulfill the lawyer’s duties to the client.149 Those 
duties include providing competent representation, keeping confidences, 
exercising independent judgment on the client’s behalf, and making 
decisions based solely on the lawyer’s best assessment of what is best for 
                                                                                                                     
 144. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.7 (lawyer as witness). The prohibition on 
acting as an advocate and a witness at trial is intended to prevent confusion of the trier of fact. Id. 
cmt. 2. The trial court may balance the danger of confusion with the prejudice to the client if the 
lawyer does not testify. Id. cmt. 4. 
 145. Id. r.1.7(a)(2). 
 146. Id. r. 1.7 cmt. 8. The New York conflicts rule uses the language “differing interests” but 
the substance of the analysis is the same. See ROY D. SIMON, SIMON’S NEW YORK RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT ANNOTATED 306–14 (2013). 
 147. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-384 (1994) 
(recognizing that “the representation of [a] client may be materially limited by the lawyer’s own 
interest in avoiding discipline”). 
 148. Several classic conflicts cases establish this functional mode of analysis. See Brennan’s, 
Inc. v. Brennan’s Rests., Inc., 590 F.2d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 1979); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. 
Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir. 1978); Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Levin, 579 
F.2d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 1978); Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386–87 (2d Cir. 
1976). 
 149. See cases cited supra note 148. 
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the client. Importantly, the conflicts rules are risk rules, not harm rules.150 
A conflict exists if there is a significant risk of interference with 
professional values such as loyalty and independence.151 Actual harm to 
the client is not an element of a conflict of interest, as understood in the 
civil litigation or transactional context. To put it another way, there is 
really no difference between actual and potential conflicts for purposes 
of the rules of professional conduct. If there is a significant risk that the 
attorney’s personal interests would materially limit the representation of 
a client, there is a conflict of interest, period.152  
A significant source of confusion when considering the relationship 
between the Sixth Amendment and conflict-of-interest doctrine under the 
rules of professional conduct is the distinction between actual and 
potential conflicts in Cuyler v. Sullivan.153 Because the conflict-of-
interest provisions of the disciplinary rules are risk rules, not harm rules, 
there is really no such thing as a “potential” conflict under the rules.154 
Either a risk of material limitation is sufficiently significant to trigger the 
requirements of informed consent and waiver, or there is no conflict.155 
                                                                                                                     
 150. See Kevin McMunigal, Rethinking Attorney Conflict of Interest Doctrine, 5 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 823, 839 (1992) (“Much of conflict of interest doctrine reflects a risk avoidance 
approach.”). 
 151. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 1.  
 152. Id. r. 1.7(a)(2); see HAZARD ET AL., supra note 32, § 10.4, at 10–13 (“[I]n modern 
thinking about conflicts of interest, it is no longer appropriate to speak of ‘potential’ versus 
‘actual’ conflicts of interest. Instead, these terms, if they are used at all, must have reference to 
the degree of likelihood that the risk—the potentiality—will ripen into adverse effect—the 
actuality.”). 
 153. 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980) (holding that “to demonstrate a violation of his Sixth 
Amendment rights, a defendant must establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected 
his lawyer’s performance” as opposed to a “possible conflict of interest”); see People v. Holmes, 
565 N.E.2d 950, 956, 958 (Ill. 1990) (attempting to impose some order on labels such as “potential 
conflict” and “possible conflict”).  
 154. That statement is true regarding the ABA Model Rules and the forty-nine states that 
have disciplinary rules based on the Model Rules. See supra text accompanying note 78. 
California, however, retains an idiosyncratic regulatory scheme, with a blend of court rules and 
statutes. See supra note 78. The California conflicts of interest rule refers to the distinction 
between actual and potential conflicts. See CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3-310(C)(1)–(2) 
(2015), http://rules.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/10/documents/2015_CaliforniaRulesofProfessionalCon 
duct.pdf. Judicial interpretation of the rule has brought it closer to the Model Rules. California 
courts have held that a potential conflict cannot be purely hypothetical but must be an identifiable 
scenario in which it is reasonably likely that an actual conflict will arise. See Havasu Lakeshore 
Invs., LLC v. Fleming, 158 Cal. Rptr. 3d 311, 319 (Ct. App. 2013); Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. 
v. Paladino, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906, 913 (Ct. App. 2001). Thus, in Model Rules terms, what the 
California rules refer to as a potential conflict is one in which duties owed to another client 
materially limit the lawyer’s representation of a client. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 
1.7(a)(2). 
 155. See discussion infra Sections II.B, II.C; see also Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 
162 (1988) (holding that a district court may refuse to accept waivers of conflict because it has an 
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For Sixth Amendment purposes, however, federal courts do use the 
language of actual and potential conflicts.156 In Cuyler, two private 
lawyers jointly represented John Sullivan, one of three codefendants in a 
murder case.157 Sullivan did not raise an objection to the concurrent 
representation.158 After his conviction, Sullivan filed an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim based on a conflict of interest arising from the 
concurrent representation.159 Because his lawyers did not object, Sullivan 
was required to show that “potential conflicts impermissibly imperil[ed] 
his right to a fair trial”160—that they were in a sense actual conflicts. As 
the Court put it, “a defendant who raised no objection at trial must 
demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his 
lawyer’s performance.”161 One must be careful here, however, because 
the definition of “actual conflict” has a great deal in common with the 
way the state rules of professional conduct understand the conflicts 
provisions as risk rules. Most importantly, an actual conflict does not 
equate with Strickland prejudice—a showing that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that but for the conflict, the result of the trial would have been 
different.162 Rather, once an attorney has an actual conflict of interest, the 
court presumes prejudice.163 What, then, is an actual conflict of interest 
if not something that likely had an effect on the outcome of the trial? 
Considering the cases cited by the Court in Cuyler and the interpretation 
of Cuyler by subsequent cases, it is apparent that the standard of an 
“actual conflict of interest [that] adversely affected” the performance of 
counsel164 is not a two-element test. In other words, an actual conflict is 
one that adversely affects counsel’s performance, as opposed to a merely 
theoretical possibility of an interference with the loyalties of the 
                                                                                                                     
obligation to monitor proceedings for conflicts and must do so from “the murkier pretrial context 
when relationships between parties are seen through a glass, darkly”). 
 156. See, e.g., Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350. 
 157. Id. at 337.   
 158. Id. at 337–38. The lack of objection distinguishes the case from Holloway v. Arkansas, 
435 U.S. 475, 477 (1978), where the trial court refused to investigate the possibility of a conflict 
of interest despite the lawyer’s timely objection to being appointed to represent three codefendants 
concurrently.  
 159. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 338.  
 160. Id. at 348. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). The Court decided Cuyler 
before Strickland, so obviously it could not have explicitly made reference to the second, 
prejudice prong of Strickland, but subsequent cases have made the relationship between these two 
standards clear. See, e.g., Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166, 168, 171 (2002). 
 163. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349–50. 
 164. Id. at 350. 
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lawyer.165 This is somewhere between the Model Rule 1.7(a)(2) standard 
of a significant risk of a material limitation on the representation, on the 
one hand, and a showing of actual harm or Strickland prejudice on the 
other. 
To emphasize, concluding that a conflict of interest does not invoke 
the presumption of prejudice under Cuyler does not take the conduct out 
from the state disciplinary rules. For example, a lawyer who obtains 
media rights to a portrayal based on information relating to the 
representation of a client violates a clear and unambiguous provision in 
the state disciplinary rules.166 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit has held, however, that the client must still show Strickland 
prejudice to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based 
on this conflict of interest.167 Whatever one thinks of the court’s 
reasoning in Beets, there is no suggestion that the lawyer’s conduct was 
anything other than an act of self-interest that breached the lawyer’s 
fundamental fiduciary obligation to his client. The court lists other types 
of conflict for which the second prong of Strickland must be satisfied and, 
like the media-rights case, all are clear violations of the disciplinary 
rules—accepting a case when the lawyer is too busy to handle it 
competently; accepting payment from someone other than the client 
without obtaining the client’s informed consent; and continuing to 
represent a client when it is likely that the attorney will be called as a 
witness.168 There is a conflict in all of these cases—the lawyer acted 
improperly—notwithstanding the inapplicability of the Cuyler 
presumption. Interestingly, the court mentions a fourth situation: “An 
attorney has neglected to file a competency motion. To cover up the 
mistake, it is alleged, he tardily files an inadequate motion.”169 This is 
exactly the problem considered here and, regardless of whether it falls 
within the Cuyler presumption, it is clearly a conflict of interest under the 
rules. 
In the hypothetical discussed above, in Model Rules terms, what did 
Lawyer do wrong that constituted a conflict of interest? Obviously he 
erred by misunderstanding rent calculation under the new formula 
proposed by Landlord. But that is a simple failure of competence, not a 
conflict of interest. A conflict requires a substantial likelihood of 
interference with the performance of a duty that counsel owes to the 
                                                                                                                     
 165. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 171 (“‘[A]n actual conflict of interest’ mean[s] precisely a 
conflict that affected counsel’s performance―as opposed to a mere theoretical division of 
loyalties.”). 
 166. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). 
 167. Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1266–69 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 168. Id. at 1271; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT rr. 1.1, 1.8(f), 3.7.  
 169. Beets, 65 F.3d at 1271.  
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client.170 The conflict manifests itself later, when Lawyer is advising his 
client, Dealership, acting through its duly authorized agent, President, 
about what to do next. Lawyer’s own interest may be to cover up or 
minimize the mistake, and this interest may cause him to be excessively 
optimistic when reading the cases on the mistake-of-fact defense. This 
personal interest materially limits Lawyer’s representation of Dealership 
because it creates a significant risk that Lawyer will not be able to advise 
Dealership competently and provide the independent advice owed to the 
client.171 The essence of the conflict is the failure of Lawyer’s impartiality 
caused by Lawyer’s own interest in avoiding liability or discipline. 
B.  Waivability 
Under the Model Rules, most concurrent conflicts of interest are 
consentable or waivable (used interchangeably) with full disclosure. 
Certain conflicts are not waivable, however.172 The three categories of 
non-waivable conflicts are (i) representations prohibited by law,173 (ii) 
assertion of a claim against another client represented by the lawyer in 
the same litigation,174 and (iii) conflicts so severe that the lawyer could 
not reasonably believe it possible to provide competent and diligent 
representation to both clients.175 Categories (i) and (ii) state per se rules 
of non-waivability but are relatively narrow in scope. In criminal defense 
representation and in the context of prior-work conflicts, non-waivable 
conflicts will generally fall within the third category. A non-consentable 
conflict would arise from a mistake so serious that no reasonable lawyer 
could believe it is possible to provide effective representation to the client 
while worrying about her own potential liability.  
Many conflicts may be waivable in theory, but for practical reasons it 
                                                                                                                     
 170. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 8 (explaining when a conflict will 
rise to a violation of the rule).  
 171. See id. r. 1.7(a)(2) (addressing material-limitation conflicts); id. r. 1.1 (addressing 
competence); id. r. 2.1 (addressing independence). 
 172. Id. r. 1.7(b). The non-waivability provision of the concurrent conflicts rule is drafted 
negatively, so it actually states conditions for a conflict to be waivable. That is, a conflict is 
waivable if it does not fall into one of the three specified categories. See id. 
 173. Id. r. 1.7(b)(2). This is a relatively limited category of non-waivable conflicts, the most 
common instance of which is when a statute or regulation applicable to a former government 
official prohibits a lawyer from representing a client in private practice. See id. r. 1.7 cmt. 16; 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 122 cmt. g(i) (AM. LAW INST. 2000).  
 174. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b)(3). Note that this standard differs from one 
of the tests for defining a conflict of interest. A conflict may exist if the interests of one client are 
directly adverse to the interests of another client of the lawyer or law firm. Id. r. 1.7(a)(1). The 
conflict is only non-waivable, however, if the lawyer or firm attempts to represent both sides of 
the litigation simultaneously. Id. r. 1.7(b)(3). 
 175. Id. r. 1.7(b)(1); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 122 cmt. 
g(iii). 
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may be impossible to obtain informed consent. A frequent scenario in 
private practice, though unlikely to arise in criminal defense 
representation, occurs when the lawyer has confidential information 
regarding one client that the lawyer would ordinarily have to disclose to 
another client as part of the process of obtaining both clients’ informed 
consent to a conflict of interest.176 A problem more likely to exist in the 
Martinez dilemma is that the lawyer’s own involvement in the ineffective 
representation makes it difficult for the lawyer to provide the kind of 
candid, impartial disclosure to which the client is entitled. This is 
technically a failure of informed consent, not an evaluation of the conflict 
as non-waivable. A further problem that may arise in the case of multiple 
representation in a criminal defense matter, but not civil litigation, is that 
the district court has the authority to decline to accept waivers of conflicts 
of interest.177 A lawyer may believe a conflict is waivable and obtain the 
client’s informed consent, yet the court may nevertheless disqualify the 
lawyer under Rule 44(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
C.  Informed Consent and Its Limitations 
If a conflict is consentable—and most are—informed consent requires 
that the lawyer provide full disclosure of “the relevant circumstances and 
of the material and reasonably foreseeable ways that the conflict could 
have adverse effects on the interests of that client.”178 The purpose of the 
                                                                                                                     
 176. See, e.g., Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, Formal Op. 2005-02 (2005). 
 177. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160–63 (1988). If the district court is too 
deferential to prosecutors who are insisting on the disqualification of defense counsel for some 
highly speculative theory of a conflict, the result may be to deprive defendants of the counsel of 
their choice—and sometimes highly effective defense counsel—with no corresponding gain in 
the protection afforded by the conflicts rules to either the interests of defendants or the integrity 
of the adversarial process. See Bruce A. Green, “Through a Glass, Darkly”: How the Court Sees 
Motions to Disqualify Criminal Defense Lawyers, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1201, 1250 (1989) (“The 
defendant has an interest in receiving the effective assistance of counsel, in receiving the 
assistance of his attorney of choice, and in deciding for himself whether to undertake the risks 
attendant to counsel’s potential conflict. These interests are obviously undermined by the defense 
counsel’s disqualification, which may deprive the defendant of the possible strategic advantage 
of being represented by a particular attorney and may derogate his interest in deciding for himself 
whether to continue with an attorney who may have a conflict or to seek different 
representation.”). 
 178. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 18. “Informed consent” is a defined term 
in the Model Rules. See id. r. 1.0(e) (defining “informed consent” as the “agreement by a person 
to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and 
explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed 
course of conduct”). The 1983 version of the Model Rules used the term “consent after 
consultation.” See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’s Responsibility, Formal Op. 05-436 (2005) 
(noting that in 2002 the ABA Commission of Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
replaced the term “consent after consultation” with the term “informed consent”). Although the 
term “informed consent” is preferable, due to its association—drawn intentionally by the drafters 
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informed-consent standard is to permit the client to make an autonomous 
decision to proceed with the representation despite the existence of a 
conflict. The client may decide, for example, that the cost and 
inconvenience of switching lawyers is not worth it, given what the client 
perceives as only a slight risk that a conflict of interest will impair the 
lawyer’s ability to provide competent and diligent representation. The 
overarching idea of informed consent is that many decisions regarding 
the representation are for the client to make, but the lawyer must give the 
client sufficient information to participate intelligently in the decision-
making process.179 The lawyer has a fiduciary duty to act in her client’s 
best interests, as the client defines them, after consultation.180 The agency 
or fiduciary model of allocation of decision-making authority, recognized 
by the common law of agency and the Model Rules,181 presupposes both 
the client’s ability to participate in the decision-making process and the 
attorney’s ability (and willingness) to communicate all relevant 
information. Because clients frequently lack the expertise necessary to 
make decisions about their legal rights and liabilities, they are necessarily 
dependent upon their lawyer. The attorney and client thus have 
coordinating roles in decision-making. The client has the final authority 
with respect to the objectives of the representation, but the lawyer owes 
the client fully informed, candid, and impartial advice by a lawyer acting 
solely in the client’s best interests. 
The informed-consent standard is similar to the “knowing and 
intelligent waiver” test used in many areas of criminal procedure. For 
example, the Supreme Court in Moran v. Burbine,182 evaluating a waiver 
of a suspect’s Miranda rights, asked whether the suspect waived those 
rights with “full awareness of both the nature of the right being 
abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.”183 The 
informed-consent standard in civil conflicts-of-interest law “requires that 
each affected client be aware of the material respects in which the 
                                                                                                                     
of the Ethics 2000 version of the Model Rules—with the doctrine of informed consent in medical 
malpractice law, the older term “consent after consultation” does have the virtue of reminding 
lawyers that they first have an obligation to consult with their clients before seeking the client’s 
waiver. See HAZARD ET AL., supra note 32, § 10.8, at 10-23 (emphasizing the initial step of full 
disclosure to the client of all aspects of the conflict). See generally Susan R. Martyn, Informed 
Consent in the Practice of Law, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 307 (1980) (tracing the development of 
informed consent in medical malpractice law and the law governing lawyers). 
 179. HAZARD ET AL., supra note 32, § 7.4, at 7-7 (“If the client is to make turning-point 
decisions about his legal affairs, he must be armed with sufficient information for intelligent 
decisionmaking.”). 
 180. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a). 
 181. See id. 
 182. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986). 
 183. Id. at 421. 
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representation could have adverse effects on the interests of that 
client.”184 Conflicts involving credible allegations of attorney misconduct 
present a difficult variation on the problem of obtaining informed 
consent. In the prior-work conflicts hypothetical this Article considers, 
the issue is not merely that the adverse effect of the lawyer’s mistake on 
the client’s interests might be expensive and time-consuming to unwind, 
and might have further consequences down the line. The further adverse 
effect is that the attorney’s reluctance to “fess up” to a mistake 
compromises the lawyer’s own ability to give that advice. The lawyer’s 
inability to provide fully candid, impartial advice impairs the client’s 
capacity to make fully informed decisions concerning the 
representation.185  
Complicating the process of providing full disclosure is the possibility 
that the lawyer’s desire not to admit his mistakes may operate at an 
unconscious level. In an important article on lawyer liability for aiding 
and abetting client fraud, Professor Don Langevoort reviews the 
empirical literature on social cognition and concludes that certain 
cognitive effects present an obstacle to lawyers perceiving the warning 
signs of fraud.186 Importantly, many of these processes occur at the 
unconscious or “preconscious” level, so the actor sincerely believes she 
is acting rationally.187 For example, once someone is committed to a 
position, “the subsequent discovery of information that indicates harmful 
consequences flowing from that commitment directly threatens their self-
concept as good, worthwhile individuals,” with the result that the person 
suppresses or ignores certain information that should function as a “red 
flag” warning of danger.188 The phenomenon of escalating 
commitment—gamblers doubling down on a losing hand or bankers 
throwing good money after bad—can be explained in this way.189 In the 
case of prior-work conflicts caused by the lawyer’s malpractice, it is 
likely that the lawyer ignored at least some evidence of having made a 
mistake and will therefore not be in a position to provide the kind of 
candid, impartial advice that the client deserves and is entitled to under 
the doctrine of informed consent.190  
                                                                                                                     
 184. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 122 cmt. c(i) (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000).  
 185.  See Martyn, supra note 178, at 330 (recognizing the material impairment to a client’s 
decision-making when the lawyer has not fully informed the client). 
 186. See Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into 
Lawyers’ Responsibility for Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 95–96 (1993).  
 187. Id. at 97.  
 188. Id. at 102–03.  
 189. Id. at 103.  
 190. Pertinent to the issues considered here, Professor Tigran Eldred recently published an 
application of the research on this kind of motivated reasoning to the ethical obligations of 
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It is important to stress that this occurs unconsciously, so that the actor 
is unaware of her blind spot with respect to this evidence.191 A lawyer 
may believe, in absolute, subjective good faith, that she has provided 
effective representation to the client even though an impartial observer 
not affected by the same perceptual and cognitive limitations could 
discern the malpractice. An attorney may believe she is fully disclosing 
to the client all material effects on the client’s interests, but she will in 
fact not be fully informing the client because of unconscious processes 
that lead to the construal of some of the attorney’s actions as not mistakes 
at all. It is a natural human reaction to attempt to minimize the 
responsibility for one’s own failings: 
Commonly, lawyers against whom [allegations of 
ineffective assistance of counsel] are raised react with 
disappointment, outrage, and anger. When these feelings 
subside, the next usual response is to develop a strategy to 
defend the allegations. Unfortunately, from that point on, 
many attorneys facing a claim of ineffective assistance tend 
to distance themselves from the former clients and even to 
create an adversarial relationship between themselves and 
their former clients.192 
The result of this process of an attorney coming to grips with her 
mistakes, however, may be that the informed-consent standard is not 
doing the work it is designed to do—allowing the client to make 
autonomous decisions about whether to proceed with a representation 
despite the existence of a conflict of interest—because the lawyer’s 
inability to perceive her mistakes clearly may interfere with the attorney’s 
role as the advisor to the client. To make this discussion less abstract, 
return to the hypothetical of the prior-work conflict of interest but vary 
the facts slightly: Imagine that President was surprised to find that the 
rental payment had increased significantly and asked Lawyer to explain 
why this had occurred. Lawyer is now looking back at his conduct in the 
course of renegotiating the lease, considering at least two possibilities: 
(1) “I screwed up” and (2) “Landlord screwed me.”  
                                                                                                                     
predecessor counsel in capital cases. See generally Tigran W. Eldred, Motivation Matters: 
Guideline 10.13 and Other Mechanisms for Preventing Lawyers from Surrendering to Self-
Interest in Responding to Allegations of Ineffective Assistance in Death Penalty Cases, 42 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 473 (2013). 
 191. See generally MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE FAIL 
TO DO WHAT’S RIGHT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2012) (discussing ethical blind spots, the gap 
between what a person wants to be and what the person actually is, and ways to be aware of and 
remove these blind spots). 
 192. Eldred, supra note 190, at 486 (quoting Michael Mears, The Defense Attorney’s Ethical 
Response to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, G. B.J., Oct. 1999, at 40, 42) (alteration in 
original). 
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The unconscious psychological process of motivated reasoning makes 
it likely that Lawyer will tend to attribute the explanation for the 
increased rent to some trickiness or deception by Landlord. In fact, from 
an objective point of view, Lawyer’s conduct fell below the applicable 
standard of care—“the competence and diligence normally exercised by 
lawyers in similar circumstances.”193 But clients do not receive 
information and advice from an objective point of view. Their legal 
advisors, in large part, provide their understanding of the available 
options and the risks and benefits associated with each of them. There is 
thus a significant likelihood that Lawyer may not inform President that 
the client, Dealership, has the option of filing a declaratory judgment 
action to void the new lease on the ground of a mutual mistake of fact. 
The informed-consent standard works only if the client has full 
information, but the lawyer’s dual role as provider of information and 
cause of the problem limits the provision of full information. The lawyer 
is responsible for ensuring that the client has adequate information, but 
the lawyer’s discomfiture at an accusation of making a mistake impairs 
her ability to carry out this responsibility. 
Would it help to require lawyers to recommend that their clients 
consult with independent counsel when there is a credible allegation of 
misconduct? The Model Rules suggest that “[i]n some circumstances it 
may be appropriate for a lawyer to advise a client . . . to seek the advice 
of other counsel,”194 but again the operation of this norm depends on a 
prior determination by the lawyer either that the lawyer made a mistake 
or that an allegation of wrongdoing is credible. Clients may accuse 
lawyers of malpractice absent valid grounds, and it would be unduly 
cumbersome and expensive to require that lawyers recommend that their 
clients consult with independent counsel whenever there is any allegation 
of carelessness. It appears to be impossible to avoid the critical threshold 
judgment of the existence of a conflict of interest being made by the 
lawyer whose conduct has been called into question. 
D.  Clients with Diminished Decision-Making Capacity 
All of this analysis of the allocation of decision-making authority in 
the attorney–client relationship assumes that the client has the capacity to 
understand and act upon information pertaining to his rights and options 
going forward. The theoretical ground for the informed-consent doctrine 
is the value of autonomy and the right of competent adult clients to make 
decisions pertaining to their own well-being.195 Clients with ordinary 
decision-making capacity should be allowed to choose among a variety 
                                                                                                                     
 193. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52(1) (AM. LAW INST. 
2000). 
 194. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.0 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).  
 195. See Martyn, supra note 178, at 312. 
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of options for the representation, provided they are fully informed about 
the risks and benefits of their choices. But there are many clients whose 
“capacity to make adequately considered decisions in connection with the 
representation is diminished . . . because of minority, physical illness, 
mental disability, or other cause.”196  
In these cases, the Model Rules rather unhelpfully instruct lawyers to 
maintain as normal an attorney–client relationship as possible.197 To the 
extent this means only treating the client with respect, listening carefully, 
and trying to ascertain the client’s views about his interests, this is 
perfectly sensible advice. But when it comes to making critical decisions 
about the representation, lawyers cannot rely on clients with diminished 
capacity to provide effective informed consent. They may have the option 
to seek the appointment of a guardian to make decisions on behalf of the 
client,198 but if no representative is available to make these decisions, the 
lawyer may have no choice but to muddle through, acting on the basis of 
the lawyer’s reasonable view of the client’s interests if the client were 
able to make adequately considered decisions.199 A lawyer’s personal 
interest in covering up the mistake therefore affects the lawyer who 
makes a mistake in the course of representing a client with diminished 
capacity at two levels—first, in recognizing the mistake and the conflict 
it may have caused and second, in reaching a decision about what would 
be in the client’s best interests.  
The diminished-capacity problem arises even for lawyers who are 
completely conflict-free. Take the case of a lawyer representing a client 
on death row who has instructed the lawyer that he has decided to “accept 
responsibility” for his crimes and that the lawyer should waive all appeals 
and should in all other respects simply acquiesce in the imposition of the 
death sentence.200 As long as the defendant has a rational and factual 
understanding of the consequences of his decision,201 which is an 
extremely lenient standard for competency, he theoretically has the right 
to waive his appeals.202 In principle, this means his lawyer must “abide 
by [the] client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation.”203 
                                                                                                                     
 196. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24(1). 
 197. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.14(a) (“[T]he lawyer shall, as far as reasonably 
possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.”).  
 198. See id. r. 1.14(b). 
 199. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24(2).  
 200. See John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: “Volunteers,” Suicide and Competency, 103 
MICH. L. REV. 939, 939–40, 982 (2005) (asking whether a death row inmate who wishes to waive 
his appeals should be viewed as a client accepting the justness of his punishment or as a person 
seeking the aid of the state in committing suicide).  
 201. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993). 
 202. See Blume, supra note 200, at 945, 946.  
 203. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a). 
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As experienced capital defense lawyers know, however, serious mental 
illness is common among their clients, and even those who do not have 
chronic, untreated mental illness often suffer from episodic bouts of 
depression, which can temporarily interfere with their ability to make 
rational decisions.204 Many of these same clients have subsequently 
expressed deep gratitude to their lawyers for not acting on instructions to 
waive appeals.205 But the law governing lawyers does not really 
recognize this possibility. If anything, the law is so strongly committed 
to the value of client autonomy that it goes too far in discouraging lawyers 
from trying to talk sense into despondent clients or taking other actions 
in the client’s long-term best interest. For example, the Restatement 
comments on the diminished-capacity rule warn lawyers not to infer a 
disability from their clients’ seemingly irrational instructions: 
“Lawyers . . . should be careful not to construe as proof of disability a 
client’s insistence on a view of the client’s welfare that a lawyer considers 
unwise or otherwise at variance with the lawyer’s own views.”206 This is 
sound advice in the mine run of cases, but in light of the prevalence of 
serious mental illness and cognitive disabilities among death row 
inmates, capital defense lawyers need some latitude to act on their 
assessment of what is best for their clients when there is reasonable doubt 
about the client’s capacity to make an informed decision. 
Many lawyers would object on the ground of paternalism to the 
Restatement’s directive to pursue the client’s interests as the client would 
define them “if able to make adequately considered decisions,”207 even if 
the lawyer were acting in the utmost good faith, without any personal 
bias. The lawyers who represented the Unabomber, Ted Kaczynski, and 
persuaded (or tricked) him into allowing them to put on mental-status 
evidence208 were not biased or incompetent—in fact, the dissenting judge 
went out of his way to call them “superb” lawyers.209 Nevertheless, they 
were criticized for overriding their client’s express instruction that they 
not portray him as mentally ill.210 As Professor David Luban argues, they 
violated Kaczynski’s right to be treated with dignity by “rid[ing] 
roughshod over the commitments that make the client’s life meaningful 
and so impart dignity to it.”211 Of course, they did so based on the belief 
that Kaczynski’s life commitments would be all for naught if the state 
                                                                                                                     
 204. See Blume, supra note 200, at 944, 968.  
 205. See id. at 940. 
 206. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24, cmt. c. 
 207. Id. § 24(2) (emphasis added). 
 208. See United States v. Kaczynski, 239 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 209. See id. at 1121 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
 210. Id.  
 211. DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 76–77 (2007). 
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executed him.212 There are good moral arguments for both courses of 
action in this case—either respecting Kaczynski’s commitments even at 
the expense of allowing him to participate in judicially sanctioned suicide 
or overriding his commitments in an effort to save his life. Where the 
lawyer is laboring under a conflict due to a prior instance of incompetent 
representation, however, there is even less reason to grant decision-
making authority to the lawyer at the expense of the client. The actions 
of Kaczynzski’s lawyers were admirable because their objective, 
preventing his execution, is one that a rational person could share. 
(Whether the judicial system should permit a seriously mentally ill person 
to represent himself and thereby consent to “an execution following a trial 
that lacked the fundamental elements of due process, and was farcical at 
worst,”213 is a separate matter.) But there is nothing admirable about a 
lawyer who overrides his client’s directives out of a desire to hide his 
own malpractice. This observation only sharpens the issue of the 
representation of capital defendants with diminished capacity. To the 
extent a lawyer has the authority to “pursue the lawyer’s reasonable view 
of the client’s objectives or interests,”214 the capacity of the informed-
consent doctrine to protect client interests is weakened. Throw in the 
problem of conflicts of interest and the problem of alienation of clients 
from their constitutional entitlement to effective assistance of counsel 
becomes even more acute. 
III.  WHY CRIMINAL DEFENSE, AND PARTICULARLY CAPITAL 
DEFENSE, IS DIFFERENT 
The reflexive response to the Martinez problem is obvious: state post-
conviction counsel should not represent capital clients in subsequent 
federal habeas corpus proceedings because of the possibility of conflicts 
of interest. Judges should appoint new counsel to represent the client in 
federal court. If the failure to raise a claim adequately, or at all, in the 
state courts can transform a claim that is procedurally defaulted into one 
that federal courts can entertain on the merits, then someone other than 
the lawyer who represented the client in state courts must review the 
record and conduct an investigation to see if there are any such claims. 
Lawyers are generally not allowed to assess—much less litigate—the 
quality of their own representation. Thus, because of the potential conflict 
of interest state post-conviction counsel inevitably has, new counsel is 
needed in federal habeas corpus proceedings to determine whether there 
                                                                                                                     
 212. See id. at 77 (arguing that Kaczynski had a different theory of his case than his lawyers, 
but Kaczynski eventually and reluctantly took his lawyers’ advice).  
 213. Kaczynski, 239 F.3d at 1128 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
 214. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24(2) (AM. LAW INST. 
1998). 
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are additional claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that should 
have been raised in the prior state collateral proceedings.215 Some courts, 
in fact, have taken this reflexive position.216 
But, is it always in a death row inmate’s best interests for state post-
conviction counsel to be relieved and for new counsel to be appointed? 
Clearly not; in many—if not most—jurisdictions, the number of 
competent and experienced capital post-conviction counsel is quite small. 
The relieved state collateral appeals attorney may be quite experienced 
and very skilled, and the new lawyers that will be appointed may not be 
nearly as competent. Given that it is often unknown whether anything 
was overlooked in state post-conviction proceedings, and if so, whether 
anything not raised is potentially meritorious, a disruption in 
representation is definitely not always in the client’s best interests. In 
other cases, the attorney–client relationship that has developed may be so 
strong that a disruption in representation could have significant adverse 
effects on the client’s mental state or willingness to proceed with the 
appeals.217 Thus, it is not difficult to envision cases in which sticking with 
long-time counsel offers the inmate the best chance to prevail and thus to 
live. The difficulty lies in determining which category a particular case 
falls in. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that an inmate generally 
makes this type of decision with the advice of counsel, but in the cases 
this Article describes, counsel is the very lawyer whose past errors may 
entitle the inmate to proceed with what would otherwise be procedurally 
defaulted claims. 
Thus, the ethical conundrum is how to assess whether state post-
conviction counsel can or should continue to represent the client in 
federal habeas corpus proceedings. In the abstract, it would be 
                                                                                                                     
 215. In theory, the same analysis would apply in non-capital cases as well. But, this Article 
limits its discussion to capital cases for several reasons. First, in non-capital cases, inmates seeking 
state collateral relief are often unrepresented; thus, counsel will not have the opportunity to 
provide substandard representation. And because non-death-sentenced inmates are not entitled to 
court-appointed counsel in federal habeas corpus proceedings, most are unrepresented in federal 
court as well. Thus, in the small percentage of cases where this issue arises, if counsel were to 
withdraw following state post-conviction proceedings, the client would be left without any 
representation. Second, despite often being “honored in the breach,” this Article also falls back 
on the simple reality that “death is different.”  
 216. Owens v. Stirling, No. o:15;mc-00254-TLW-PJG (D.S.C. Aug. 13, 2015) (refusing to 
appoint state PCR counsel in habeas corpus proceedings after attorney general objected to their 
appointment based on a potential conflict of interest). 
 217. Clients who attempt to waive their appeals and submit to execution are frequently 
referred to as “volunteers.” Blume, supra note 200, at 940. Approximately twelve percent of all 
people executed in the United States are volunteers. Id. at 1008. Most have a serious mental 
illness, and disruptions in relationships can trigger the decision. Id. at 962. Thus, it is not 
impossible to imagine situations where a change in counsel could render a death row inmate so 
distraught that he decided to “volunteer” for execution. 
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theoretically possible to have independent counsel (1) review the record 
of the proceedings below, (2) conduct any needed investigation, (3) 
consult with the client about the pros and cons of having former counsel 
continue with the representation, and (4) allow the client to make a 
knowing and intelligent decision as to how to proceed.218 Again, in 
theory, the client would then be in a position to decide whether to request 
new counsel or to waive any potential conflict of interest arising from 
continued representation, i.e., give informed consent.219 But this ideal 
poses several practical problems as well, such as: who will those lawyers 
be, and who will compensate them? Given both the small number of 
attorneys competent to represent a death-sentenced inmate in federal 
habeas corpus proceedings and fiscal constraints in difficult economic 
times, systemic resistance to such a proposal is not difficult to imagine. 
It also raises questions of efficiency, i.e., if the court is going to pay 
someone to review the files, investigate the case, and become sufficiently 
“up to speed” to advise the client on the benefits and dangers of continued 
representation, then why not just appoint new counsel? Courts may also 
worry about the informal game-theoretic implications of Martinez, such 
as whether lawyers might attempt to sandbag by committing an error in 
state post-conviction proceedings that they could then subsequently raise 
as a ground for filing a federal habeas petition, all with a view toward 
creating delay and prolonging the life of their client. 
A less cumbersome procedure would be to have independent counsel 
explain to the client that inadequate assistance of state post-conviction 
counsel may be a gateway to merits’ review of defaulted claims of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that proceeding with current 
counsel would constitute a waiver of any such claims. While better than 
nothing, this hardly seems adequate for a knowing and intelligent waiver 
of the potential conflict of interest. Without the type of review described 
above, neither the attorney providing the “advice” nor the client will have 
an accurate assessment of the risks of continuing with state post-
conviction counsel. Thus, it is difficult to see how any purported waiver 
could in any real sense be knowing and intelligent.  
Another option would be to place the initial responsibility of 
determining whether new counsel is needed on state post-conviction 
counsel. Upon entering federal habeas corpus proceedings, state post-
                                                                                                                     
 218. This approach has also been used in a few cases.  See, e.g., Folwer v. Joyner, 753 F.3d 
446 (4th Cir. 2014); Gray v. Pearson, 526 F. App’x. 331 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 219. See Christeson v. Roper, 135 S. Ct. 891, 893 (2015) (depicting independent counsel 
advising client not to waive the prior-work conflict by filing motion for substition). Again, 
however, the situation in Christeson is somewhat anomalous because the petitioner’s original, 
incompetent attorneys asked two independent lawyers for advice on the case. Id. at 892. The 
independent lawyers then noticed the conflict and moved for substitution of counsel. Id. at 892–
93. If the original two attorneys had not asked for this advice the client may never have found out 
about the conflict. See id. at 892. 
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conviction counsel—assuming she desires to continue representing the 
client—would be required to reassess the quality of her representation in 
state proceedings and then advise the client whether new counsel is 
needed. However, simply to state it as an option is to expose its patent 
deficiencies; state post-conviction counsel is frequently in no position to 
determine whether their own performance was inadequate, particularly 
given the psychological reality of having blind spots regarding one’s own 
ethical shortcomings. Furthermore, given the federal statute of limitations 
for federal habeas petitions and rules forbidding amendments to a habeas 
petition after the limitations period has expired, new counsel’s hands 
could be tied even if substantial issues were uncovered.220   
Thus, the question remains: What to do? There are a few clear 
scenarios. In cases pending in federal court, federal habeas counsel 
clearly has a potential conflict of interest where: 
(a) federal habeas counsel represented the petitioner in state 
court; and  
(b) counsel for the state has alleged that one or more claims 
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel are procedurally 
defaulted because they were not raised (at all or adequately) 
in the state court proceedings. 
In such cases, current habeas counsel must move to be relieved and 
request appointment of conflict-free counsel who can assert inadequate 
assistance of state post-conviction counsel as “cause” for the alleged 
default unless:  
(a) counsel for the state waives the procedural defense (as 
this Article contends he should when there are credible 
grounds for believing the defense attorney has a prior-work 
conflict and independent counsel is not available221);  
(b) the court concludes that the claim is not in fact barred 
because counsel fairly presented the claim to the state courts 
or for some other reason (e.g., the alleged default is not 
adequate or independent of federal law); or 
(c) the court determines the claim is not “substantial” 
because it patently lacks merit.  
 Similarly, there are instances where state post-conviction counsel 
                                                                                                                     
 220. See infra note 230.  
 221. Procedural default is an affirmative defense and, as such, can be waived. Trest v. Cain, 
522 U.S. 87, 89 (1997) (“[P]rocedural default is normally a ‘defense’ that the State is ‘obligated 
to raise’ and ‘preserv[e]’ if it is not to ‘lose the right to assert the defense thereafter.’” (alteration 
in original)). 
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intends to continue as federal habeas counsel and the federal courts have 
appointed that counsel under the Criminal Justice Act pursuant to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in McFarland v. Scott,222 and in the course of 
preparing the petition for writ of habeas corpus discovers one or more 
potential claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that were not 
raised in the state collateral proceedings (or not raised adequately). In 
these instances, counsel has an obligation to inform the court and the 
client and to ask the court to appoint counsel who is not laboring under a 
potential conflict of interest for, at a minimum, the purpose of advising 
the clients of the pros and cons of proceeding with current counsel. If the 
court denies the request, counsel is obligated to file a motion to be 
relieved based upon the potential conflict of interest. Only if the court 
denies the motion should counsel continue with the federal 
representation.   
These scenarios (and Martinez itself) raise a more fundamental issue: 
if state post-conviction counsel intends to continue representing a capital 
client in subsequent federal habeas corpus proceedings (after explaining 
the Martinez equitable “exception” to the client and ascertaining that the 
client wants counsel to continue), does counsel have an affirmative 
obligation to actually investigate the quality of their prior state court 
representation to assess—in the parlance of Martinez—its adequacy? The 
answer to this is also clear. Yes, counsel does. As counterintuitive as it 
may seem at first blush, in the post-Martinez world, where the failure to 
raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in state post-conviction 
proceedings can be excused if the omission was the result of deficient 
post-conviction representation, the continuing duty of loyalty to the client 
demands that such an inquiry be undertaken. It would be best if 
experienced post-conviction counsel could be obtained to do the record 
review and conduct the investigation, but little about capital post-
conviction representation reflects best practices. Courts are reluctant to 
fund such work, and experienced post-conviction counsel are overworked 
and cannot and should not be expected to perform the work for free. Thus, 
in such situations counsel will simply have no alternative but to attempt 
to assess the quality of their previous representation—honestly and 
candidly, with an awareness of the possibility of self-serving or impartial 
judgments.223  
                                                                                                                     
 222. 512 U.S. 849, 855 (1994) (holding that death-sentenced inmates have a right to have 
counsel appointed prior to filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus). 
 223. At the risk of over-complicating an already over-complicated set of possible scenarios, 
this investigation must also take place in a sufficiently timely manner to discern the existence of 
any additional, previously unraised claims before the statute of limitations for federal habeas 
petitions expires. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (2012) (requiring a federal petition to be filed within one 
year of the case becoming “final” on direct review subject to tolling during “properly filed” state 
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Many readers are likely now scratching their heads and wondering 
who created such an arcane set of doctrines that inexorably lead to what 
in any other context would be considered absurd practices and results that 
can literally result in someone with a meritorious claim being executed. 
It is not a hyperbole to classify the current regime as “Kafkaesque.” For 
the most part, fault lies with the Supreme Court. The Court’s creation of 
a number of doctrines, e.g., procedural default, ostensibly to promote 
comity and federalism but clearly intended to limit the availability of 
federal habeas corpus to state prisoners and especially death-sentenced 
inmates has made habeas practice both complicated and unforgiving.224 
Congress also must take its share of the blame for the habeas 
modifications contained in AEDPA. Numerous scholars—and even 
Supreme Court Justices—have commented on the statute’s shoddiness, 
which has in turn created numerous interpretive questions courts are still 
sorting out almost twenty years after its enactment.225 And finally, state 
legislatures and courts, which have refused to appoint and compensate 
competent counsel in state post-conviction proceedings, also must take 
their share of the blame. But the purpose of this Article is not primarily 
to look backward and assess blame for the current “pickle” the legal 
community is in, but to look forward and, at least in this particular corner 
of the habeas imbroglio, offer some possible solutions.  
One solution to the hall-of-mirrors problem created by Martinez is to 
take some of the pressure off defense counsel to be the only institutional 
actor with a responsibility to ensure that capital cases are decided fairly 
on the merits.226 This Article suggests that states’ attorneys and federal 
                                                                                                                     
post-conviction proceedings). Some courts have held—nonsensically—that Martinez’s equitable 
exception for otherwise procedurally defaulted claims is not an exception to the limitations period. 
See, e.g., Lambrix v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 756 F.3d 1246, 1262 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Martinez does 
not alter the statutory bar against filing untimely § 2554 petitions.”). Furthermore, in Mayle v. 
Felix, the Supreme Court held that a defendant could not amend a habeas petition after the 
limitations period expires to include claims unrelated to those in the timely filed petition. 545 U.S. 
644, 650 (2005). 
 224. For a more detailed discussion of the Court’s handiwork in this area, see John H. Blume, 
AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 265–70 (2006). 
 225. See, e.g., LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS: HABEAS CORPUS 57 (2003) (“AEDPA 
is notorious for its poor drafting. The Act is replete with vague and ambiguous language, apparent 
inconsistency, and plain bad grammar.”). Justice David Souter remarked that “in a world of silk 
purses and pigs’ ears, the Act is not a silk purse of the art of statutory drafting.” Lindh v. Murphy, 
521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997).  
 226. Another partial solution beyond the scope of this Article would be to require the 
appointment and adequate compensation of experienced, competent counsel in state post-
conviction proceedings and to provide reasonable funds for investigative and expert assistance. 
Most states do not provide either appointment or funding, even in capital cases. Raising the overall 
quality of state post-conviction representation would necessarily reduce the number of viable 
claims of inadequate post-conviction representation.  
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judges have an important role to play in this context. Bear in mind, it is a 
state’s invocation of the affirmative defense of procedural default—in an 
effort to prevent a federal judge from reaching the merits of a potentially 
meritorious ineffective assistance of counsel claim—that creates the 
procedural morass this Article has described. This in turn can lead to both 
inefficient litigation and unjust results. Thus, in most instances, if 
attorneys for the state agreed—either on their own or after being “leaned 
on” by the court—to waive procedural default and allow the court to 
proceed to the merits, litigation would proceed expeditiously and without 
the ethical taint of potential and actual conflicts of interest.227 If the 
claims are not bona fide, the court will reject them.  
On the other hand, if the issues not previously raised are meritorious, 
then there are no true “losers,” except possibly those people who ascribe 
to the view that death sentences resulting from a trial infected with 
prejudicial constitutional error should be carried out. The responsibility 
of avoiding the types of potential conflicts of interest this Article has 
noted lies not solely with counsel for condemned inmates. The other 
systemic and repeat players—states’ attorneys and judges—also must do 
their part. As argued above, much of the mess created by the Supreme 
Court resulted from its inconsistent approaches to the problem of 
reconciling defense counsel duties arising under the Sixth Amendment 
with the state rules of professional conduct.228 In cases such as Whiteside 
and Strickland, the Court took pains to avoid interfering with the 
profession’s capacity to self-regulate to protect clients and serve the 
public interest. But when ethically conscientious defense lawyers 
conclude that they have a conflict under the state rules of professional 
conduct because their clients may have a Sixth Amendment right to a 
merits’ review of a procedurally defaulted claim, courts should not 
consider this a problem of defense lawyers’ making and leave it to them 
to muddle through. The Court cannot consistently say, as it did in Cuyler, 
that the federal courts rely on defense lawyers to comply with their ethical 
obligation to detect and avoid conflicts of interest while leaving lawyers 
and their clients helpless when they do raise a conflict.  
                                                                                                                     
 227. Furthermore, these same attorneys general are often (at least partially) the cause of the 
alleged state procedural default. Many lawyers for the state routinely oppose state post-conviction 
counsel’s request for funding, time to conduct adequate investigations, and production of 
documents and other information that could lead to the identification of potentially meritorious 
issues. And, in some states, lawyers for the state even write the orders denying state post-
conviction relief, filling those orders with erroneous procedural default determinations. Thus, in 
equity terms—and Martinez is at bottom an equitable doctrine—in many cases the lawyers 
representing the State have “unclean hands.”  
 228. See supra Part II. 
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CONCLUSION 
Martinez forces courts to grapple with a problem that civil lawyers 
have always faced, with a significant difference. Most of the cases in Part 
III illustrating the prior-work conflicts problem arose in the context of 
legal malpractice claims asserted by clients of the law firms with a 
conflict. The ever-present threat of a malpractice suit has given rise to 
mitigating procedures, such as in-house ethics advisors who are 
sufficiently independent of the lawyers in their own firm to be able to 
give advice and take advantage of the attorney–client privilege when 
communicating with the lawyers who are providing the representation.229 
It also alerts lawyers to the fact that they are not particularly reliable 
judges of the competence of their own performance. Mitigating the risk 
of malpractice liability has thus led to the creation of practices that serve 
to protect client interests in the long run. Without the threat of civil 
liability, however, criminal lawyers do not have the same incentive to 
establish procedures to ensure their independence.230 The cost of non-
compliance with conflicts rules is, in effect, externalized to courts and 
state prosecutors. Courts will be faced with motions for substitution of 
counsel or the appointment of independent counsel to evaluate the 
performance of state post-conviction counsel; states’ attorneys general 
will have to deal with the possibility of further delay while the conflict 
issue is adjudicated. Standard law-and-economics analysis suggests that 
these institutional actors now have an incentive to minimize the expense 
and disruption caused by the Martinez doctrine.231 Moreover, the 
Constitution may require them to work toward some kind of cooperative 
solution. Defense counsel cannot solve this problem on their own. Thus, 
                                                                                                                     
 229. See Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical 
Infrastructure in Large Law Firms: A Call for Research and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691, 
692 (2002) (“[A]necdotal evidence suggests that large law firms increasingly rely on in-house 
ethics advisors, firm general counsel, and other internal specialists to manage the firm’s 
compliance with ethics and malpractice regulation.”). 
 230. Malpractice remedies for criminal defendants are generally unavailable because of 
causation doctrines. As a tort (negligence) cause of action, legal malpractice requires a showing 
of factual, but-for causation. The position of a majority of jurisdictions, with respect to factual 
causation, is that showing that a different outcome would have resulted if the lawyer had not been 
negligent would require a showing of factual innocence. That means the defendant in the criminal 
action must first have the conviction set aside, on direct or collateral review, before bringing a 
malpractice action against the lawyer. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 53, cmt. D (AM. LAW INST. 1998). A leading case is Peeler v. Hughes & Luce, 909 
S.W.2d 494, 498 (Tex. 1995) (“We therefore hold that, as a matter of law, it is the illegal conduct 
rather than the negligence of a convict's counsel that is the cause in fact of any injuries flowing 
from the conviction, unless the conviction has been overturned.”). As a practical matter, this 
means that civil malpractice actions—as opposed to Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness claims—
are greatly under-litigated. 
 231. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.1, at 179 (5th ed. 1998). 
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this Article’s tentatively hopeful conclusion to this exploration of the 
Martinez conundrum is that the institutional actors with a stake in 
procedures and outcomes will work together to ensure that credible 
claims of inadequate state post-conviction representation are investigated 
competently, that clients are fully informed and involved in the decision-
making process, and ultimately that clients’ wishes are respected. As the 
Court itself has repeatedly emphasized, the role of defense counsel must 
be understood in an institutional context; the constitutional right to 
effective assistance of counsel must be respected “not for its own sake, 
but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a 
fair trial.”232 If equity requires that a defendant is guaranteed reasonably 
competent state post-conviction representation, then judges and 
prosecutors—in addition to defense counsel—share responsibility for 
ensuring that this right is recognized.  
                                                                                                                     
 232. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984). 
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